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ANTITRUST LIMITS ON TARGETED PATENT AGGREGATION 
Alan Devlin∗ 
Abstract 
Patent-assertion entities (PAEs) are non-technology-practicing 
companies that aggregate and license patents under threat of suit. Their 
activities have drawn fire, including presidential condemnation, and 
spurred proposed legislation to protect operating firms against them. 
PAEs leverage flaws in the patent system to extort firms that 
independently invent and sell technological goods to consumers. Since 
PAEs tax innovators and appear to restrict rather than facilitate wealth 
transfer to original patentees, their worst rent-seeking practices almost 
certainly reduce net incentives to innovate and harm consumers. This 
result is more likely if the principal desirable incentive that PAEs create 
is to file patents rather than to commercialize technology. 
The idiosyncratic nature of today’s patent system facilitates PAE 
activity. Patents’ numerosity, vague scope, widespread invalidity, and 
sometimes-functional claiming prevent even the most assiduous 
technology companies from securing guaranteed clearing positions 
before building products. These conditions ensure that a universe of 
potentially infringed patents of dubious validity exists in many 
industries ex post, especially in information technology. Fortunately, 
atomized ownership of intellectual property limits enforcement ex post 
because the unlikelihood of success in asserting few patents, the risk of 
countersuit, and high litigation costs make suing a negative value 
proposition. The result is a public-goods benefit in constrained 
enforcement that ameliorates hold-up potential. Even ex post, owners of 
disaggregated patents typically lack market power unless their 
intellectual property rights are both likely valid and infringed.  
PAE accumulation changes all of that. By amassing hundreds or 
even thousands of patents, never building or selling goods, using shell 
companies to conceal the contents of their portfolios, and asserting 
patents in waves ex post, PAEs can realize immense hold-up power that 
atomized owners lack. This conclusion holds true even if the great 
majority of their patents are invalid or not infringed. Thus, many 
operating victims are vulnerable to threats of incessant litigation and are 
forced to pay tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars for licenses 
that are unnecessary to engineer successful products. Commentators 
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increasingly—though not universally—accept that PAEs harm the 
economy. The solution, however, is less clear. Many propose reforming 
the patent system, such as by requiring losing patentees to pay the other 
side’s costs and forcing PAEs to disclose their portfolios. Some 
legislative reforms appear likely, and in 2014 the Supreme Court 
considered whether to invalidate certain computer-implemented 
inventions. Nevertheless, modest changes are unlikely to provide a 
significant remedy for PAE hold-up.  
Lacking other means, some policy makers now look to antitrust law 
for solutions. Not everyone believes that competition rules proscribe 
PAE conduct or otherwise suitably constrain patent hold-up. Indeed, 
antitrust rules are not a cure-all. This Article argues, however, that 
antitrust law can viably limit certain abuses of the patent system by 
PAEs. Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes monopolization and 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits asset acquisitions that may 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. These 
provisions have sufficient teeth theoretically to catch the most egregious 
forms of hold-up founded on ex post patent aggregation and assertion. 
This Article explains how PAE activity can reduce social welfare and 
how PAEs’ targeted patent aggregation and assertion may violate 
competition rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The business world is abuzz about “patent trolls.”1 More formally 
known as patent-assertion entities (PAEs), such companies amass and 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Aggressive Patent Litigants Pose Growing Threat to 
Big Business, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB112666 
647063840131. 
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license intellectual property under threat of suit, but they do not build 
technological goods for consumers.2 Their modus operandi is to eschew 
ex ante technology-licensing markets where budding manufacturers of 
future products seek useful know-how.3 They focus on the ex post 
world where commercialized and potentially infringing goods already 
exist.4 PAEs lie silently in wait for manufacturers to invent and build 
valuable products, thus locking themselves into chosen technology.5 
Only then do they threaten or file suit, holding up makers of popular, 
and hence valuable, goods.6 From the perspective of independent 
inventors whom PAEs approach, extravagant licensing demands based 
on threat of suit may be reminiscent of extortion rackets that sell 
protection against threats of their own creation.7  
This phenomenon is possible due to shortcomings in today’s patent 
regime. Ideally, one would see vibrant licensing markets that match 
upstream inventors and downstream innovators who develop and 
market technology.8 Such Coasian bargaining would diffuse know-how, 
reward inventors with royalties tied to their insights’ incremental value 
over next-best-available technologies, and grant engineers access to 
cutting-edge knowledge in building the next generation of goods and 
services.9 Sometimes this process occurs, especially in the 
biopharmaceutical industries, but too often these ideal attributes are 
unobtainable.10 In settings ranging from telecommunications to 
                                                                                                                     
 2. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010) (coining the term 
“patent-assertion entity” to refer to “entities that use patents primarily to get licensing fees rather 
than to support the development or transfer of technology” and explaining PAEs’ role within the 
patent system). 
 3. See id. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: 
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 31–72 (2011) [hereinafter FTC, 
EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE] (discussing ex ante and ex post patent transactions). 
 4. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 50 (illustrating a situation 
where a firm has “invested in creating, developing or commercializing the patented technology” 
but “needs the ex post license to avoid liability even if it invented the technology independent of 
the patentee because patent infringement is a strict liability offense”). 
 5. See Niels J. Melius, Note, Trolling for Standards: How Courts and the Administrative 
State Can Help Deter Patent Holdup and Promote Innovation, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
161, 171 (2012). 
 6. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) (explaining the economics of a patent hold-up and its 
consequences). 
 7. See Victoria E. Luxardo, Comment, Towards a Solution to the Problem of Illegitimate 
Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable Affirmative Defense of “Fair 
Use” in Patent, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 791, 800 (2006). 
 8. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 32–45, 48. 
 9. See id.; see also Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 50–51 (2012). 
 10. See Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2195 (2009). 
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financial services and in all manner of computer-implemented 
technologies, patents are not often the principal or even material driver 
of innovation.11  
The reasons for this unfortunate state of affairs are partially 
structural. For many products, such as those in the information-
technology (IT) industry, one must combine numerous distinct 
technologies to create an end product.12 Because many of these are 
patent-eligible, a vast universe of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
exists. For instance, RPX Corp. has estimated that more than a quarter 
million patents read on smartphones alone.13 These factors, combined 
with rapid incremental innovation, competition-induced incentives to 
invent, lax disclosure requirements for obtaining a patent, vague claim 
language, limited scrutiny by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 
and an overwhelmingly large field of prior art, render an efficient patent 
regime unrealistic in the software industry.14 Most importantly, many—
perhaps most—patents are invalid.15 This is especially true of many 
computer-implemented and business-method patents that could not 
withstand scrutiny under Bilski v. Kappos,16 and of those using broad 
functional claiming that the prior art likely anticipates or renders 
obvious.17 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1262, 1279, 
1292–94 (2009); see also Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform 
Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 604–05 (2006). See generally Mark A. Lemley, 
The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 750–52 (2012) (finding that inventors 
discover almost all significant new technologies simultaneously and concluding that, under an 
incentive-to-invent rationale for the patent system, society should grant far fewer patents). 
 12. See Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 389, 390 (2007). 
 13. RPX CORP., REGISTRATION STATEMENT (FORM S-1) 59 (2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm. 
 14. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 282; John 
S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2285 (2002); 
see also Saul Levmore, Essay, The Impending iPrize Revolution in Intellectual Property Law, 
93 B.U. L. REV. 139, 155 (2013). See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers 
in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1619–24 (2003) (describing the innovation characteristics 
of the software industry and the property rights implications of cumulative innovation). 
 15. See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent 
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 687 & tbl.3 (2011); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent 
Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000); see also 
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 
AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent 
Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 420 (1994). 
 16. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).  
 17. See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 
WIS. L. REV. 905, 912. 
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Consequently, technology companies cannot secure guaranteed 
clearing positions in designing tomorrow’s products.18 This holds true 
even though the great majority of innovation taking place at the 
product-design level is independent.19 Copying is the exception rather 
than the norm.20 Firms ameliorate the systemic patent threat by 
constructing defensive IPR portfolios,21 cross-licensing,22 joining patent 
pools,23 eliciting the services of defensive patent-buying funds,24 and 
purchasing licenses to valuable asserted IPRs ex ante. They generally 
ignore other patents in the design process to avoid future allegations of 
willful infringement.25 This conduct is an imperfect solution, not least 
because some ex post lawsuits are inevitable, and patentees suing ex 
post can extract greater royalties than they would ex ante due to 
irreversible investment. It also denies some deserving inventors their 
due reward. Nevertheless, the state of affairs is workable to the extent 
that patentees in the ex post world have market power that does not 
materially surpass the power that they possessed in the ex ante world. 
This typically occurs where patents are disaggregated26 and, potentially 
more often, where they lie in the hands of operating companies that are 
vulnerable to countersuit.27 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See Edith Ramirez & Lisa Kimmel, A Competition Policy Perspective on Patent Law: 
The Federal Trade Commission’s Report on the Evolving IP Marketplace, ANTITRUST SOURCE, 
Aug. 2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/aug11_fullsource.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 19. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. 
REV. 1421, 1424 & n.3 (2009). 
 20. Id. at 1424. 
 21. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d. 901, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, 
J., by designation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 22. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 59–64 (2007), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf. 
 23. See id. at 64–66. 
 24. See Allen W. Wang, Rise of the Patent Intermediaries, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159, 
171–77 (2010). 
 25. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22. 
 26. But see infra Part III. 
 27. See Robert P. Greenspoon & Catherine M. Cottle, Don’t Assume a Can Opener: 
Confronting Patent Economic Theories with Licensing and Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 194, 195 (2011). One should not, however, exaggerate the countersuit 
threat as a constraint on patent assertion by operating companies. This is especially so given the 
increasing prevalence of so-called “privateering” arrangements in which such firms bypass that 
constraint. See Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: 
Operating Company Patent Transfers, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2013, at 1, 1, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr13_full_source.authc
heckdam.pdf; see also Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect Deployment of 
Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 
111–15 (2012). 
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Even when firms have sunk capital into their marketed product lines, 
several attributes cabin atomized patentees’ ability to hold up such 
technology implementers. The likelihood of an invalidity or non-
infringement finding and the cost of litigation make bringing suit a 
negative value proposition except when the patent is strong.28 
Furthermore, if the patentee is a practicing entity, filing an action would 
likely attract an infringement countersuit.29 The result is a public-goods 
benefit in less than complete ex post patent enforcement. This state of 
affairs is relatively desirable due to independent invention.30 Although 
patented technology is an input in the design and manufacturing 
process, it is unlike physical inputs needed to build goods in the brick-
and-mortar world. A technology firm can ask its engineers to solve a 
technical problem in designing a complex product, but a car producer 
cannot avoid purchasing metal. This difference matters. In a world of 
imperfect patent rights and high transaction costs, some patents should 
remain unenforced. 
This reality is relatively desirable, but it is not optimal. The factors 
that constrain ex post market power by patentees also prevent some 
inventors of novel, useful, and nonobvious technologies from deriving a 
pecuniary sum befitting the nature of their insights. In the absence of 
copying, though, this shortcoming is modest. Insightful inventions with 
lucrative applications produce strong patents. Their enforcement, even 
in a disaggregated state, will often be a positive value proposition. In 
other words, strong patents will likely not be underenforced. For the 
majority of patents, however, the social-welfare calculus is different. 
These IPRs tax independent invention, and the net effect of that tax is 
negative. The norm today is clean-room invention—so pervasively so 
that most infringement complaints today do not even allege copying.31 
If patent policy concerns itself with maximizing social welfare, 
particularly by spurring the creation and commercialization of new 
technologies, then it must do more than simply incentivize the filing of 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 485 (2014), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/pae.pdf 
(“[I]f the patents have a high likelihood of being invalid or not infringed, the individual inventor 
may not find it profitable to initiate litigation to attempt to force potential licensees to pay 
royalties.”); see also Edward Van Gieson & Paul Stellman, Killing Good Patents to Wipe Out 
Bad Patents: Bilski, the Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter Rules, and the Inability to Save 
Valuable Patents Using the Reissue Statute, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
403, 418 (2011). 
 29. See Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 27, at 195, 217 n.58. 
 30. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2122 (2013). See generally Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a 
Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 478–80 (2006) (discussing independent 
invention in patent law). 
 31. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1424. 
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patents. Insights described in a published government document do not 
of themselves produce realizable gains;32 marketed goods and services 
embodying these insights do.   
PAEs leverage these flaws in the patent system to amass and assert 
otherwise unenforced IPRs to hold up companies that have 
independently invented and are already marketing the claimed 
technologies.33 This practice leads many to conclude that PAEs harm 
social welfare.34 Unsurprisingly, PAEs contest this characterization, 
arguing that their aggregation strategies create an otherwise nonexistent 
market for individual inventors.35 They justify their business model by 
claiming that it solves a real, though modest, shortcoming of the 
contemporary patent regime: a limited market for the sale of patent 
licenses. For instance, Intellectual Ventures, a prominent PAE, claims to 
have invented a new technology market aimed at covering an 
“inevitable Invention Gap™” that occurs in “today’s fast-paced, high-
tech world—where companies are entering new markets and building 
products that contain upwards of thousands of patented inventions.”36 
Ultimately, the patent-troll problem is well known, but no 
comprehensive solution has emerged because the phenomenon is 
difficult to address within the framework of existing law. PAEs realize 
value for their investors and the original patentees from whom they 
acquire IPRs. Any larger problems are arguably a function of the 
legislative framework and patent milieu within which PAEs exist. In 
much the same way that intelligent tax planning is lawful even when it 
conflicts with the policy rationale underlying the tax code, PAEs’ 
patent-infringement suits might reflect the alienability, enforcement, 
and other property-right characteristics that Congress vested upon 
                                                                                                                     
 32. See, e.g., FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 9. 
 33. See Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive 
Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical 
Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2012). 
 34. See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New 
Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 345–46 (2006); Gerard N. 
Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-
Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583 (2009) (discussing how patent 
trolls inhibit innovation, which fails to serve the social goal of the patent system and creates a need 
to reform the current patent system); Henry C. Su, Invention Is Not Innovation and Intellectual 
Property Is Not Just Like Any Other Form of Property: Competition Themes from the FTC’s 
March 2011 Patent Report, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2011, at 1, 4–5, available at http://www.am 
ericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/aug11_su_7_26f.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 35. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 36. How It Works, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/index.php/li 
cense/licensing-overview (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).  
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patents,37 even if enforcement of those rights inhibits net innovation and 
harms consumers. 
Proposed antitrust solutions may appear unconvincing, in part 
because PAEs aggressively assert that they aggregate complementary, 
rather than substitutable, patents.38 Moreover, it can be challenging to 
define an antitrust prohibition that targets only the precise 
characteristics that render PAEs subversive of innovation. This is 
because many important innovators such as universities, startups, and 
semiconductor-design houses share certain characteristics of PAEs—
they do not manufacture technology goods and sometimes sue to 
vindicate their patent rights.39 The solutions to date are instead modest 
and incremental, such as denying injunctive relief in cases of ex post 
hold-up,40 limiting the entire-market-value rule,41 jettisoning the twenty-
five-percent rule of thumb for reasonable royalty calculations,42 and 
determining damages by reference to hypothetical ex ante licensing 
agreements.43 Private-ordering solutions in the form of defensive patent 
aggregators have also emerged.44 These efforts, although welcome, 
remain incomplete. 
This Article studies the economics of targeted patent aggregation 
and assertion by non-practicing entities (NPEs) and shows that the 
scrutinized behavior likely harms efficiency. It then explores the 
possibility that PAE hold-up implicates the antitrust laws and concludes 
that it does.45 Appealing to the characteristics of a hypothetical industry 
subject to zero litigation costs and perfect information, the Article 
explains that patent aggregators could actually create value through 
                                                                                                                     
 37. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal 
property.”).  
 38. See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 286 (2009) 
(observing that PAEs typically “aggregate portfolios of patents that are . . ., at most, 
complements,” thus concluding that “[p]atent trolls usually do not possess market power in a 
strong sense” and that “their aggregation does not confer market power in an antitrust sense”). 
 39. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 8 n.5; see also Mark A. 
Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 
(2008) (asserting that universities share some characteristics with patent trolls). 
 40. E.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). 
 41. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67–70 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 42. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 43. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 44. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 66–67. 
 45. Some commentators are skeptical that antitrust is an appropriate tool with which to 
address PAE activity. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 38, at 286; Justin R. Orr, Patent Aggregation: 
Models, Harms, and the Limited Role of Antitrust, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 554 (2013); 
Joshua Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, What Role Should Antitrust Play in Regulating the 
Activities of Patent Assertion Entities? 16–17 (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/defa 
ult/files/documents/public_statements/what-role-should-antitrust-play-regulating-activities-patent-asserti 
on-entities/130417paespeech.pdf (arguing that patent and contract law best address PAE activity). 
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blanket licensing, particularly by ameliorating Cournot-complement, 
royalty-stacking problems while remaining subject to competition in the 
form of direct licenses from underlying patentees. In the real world, 
however, ex post under enforcement at the individual patentee level 
obscures the economic distinction between substitutable and 
complementary patents. The economics of modern patenting behavior in 
technology industries explain why PAEs vastly magnify the market 
power that IT patents bestow at the individual level, notwithstanding a 
lack of technological overlap between IP rights in a given portfolio.  
These insights lead to a remarkable and thus-far unnoticed parallel: 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
CBS, Inc.46 sheds light on many of the issues at play in trolling 
activity.47 As PAEs magnify market power by combining patents that 
read on marketed devices while eliminating any prospect of direct 
licensing between downstream manufacturers and upstream patent-
assignors, their activities may fail scrutiny under Sections 1–2 of the 
Sherman Act and under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The rationale and 
sound precedential basis for this antitrust condemnation would 
simultaneously inoculate NPEs that serve a valuable economic function 
by engaging in ex ante technology transfer.  
Part I introduces the PAE phenomenon. Criticism of “patent trolling” 
now exists across the political spectrum; nevertheless, a raucous debate 
is underway between policy makers and academics concerning the 
effects of NPEs’ patent assertion on innovation and competition. After 
placing the PAE debate in context, Part I addresses the critical 
distinction between ex ante and ex post licensing. Observing that the 
economics of the patent system are so complex that one cannot infer 
that all patent accumulation and enforcement is inherently problematic, 
Part II outlines a series of hypothetical worlds in which competition 
variously flourishes with and without blanket or other forms of 
licensing by poolers of IPRs. This Article then explains how today’s 
patent-licensing markets actually operate. That discussion expounds a 
theory of anticompetitive effect associated with PAE behavior. Part III 
adopts this theory and applies it to substantive antitrust law to explore 
viable limits on PAE hold-up.  
I.  PAES AND THE ECONOMICS OF PATENT LICENSING 
This Part proceeds in three Sections. The first outlines typical PAE 
behavior and the opposition mounting against it. The second Section 
explores a healthier model for the relationship between patent assertion 
                                                                                                                     
 46. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 47. See id. at 6; see also Thomas J. Horton, Robert H. Lande, Should the Internet Exempt 
the Media Sector from the Antitrust Laws?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1521, 1537–38 (2013) (describing 
the “one-stop shop[] concept” that the Supreme Court applied in Broadcast Music). 
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and independent innovation. The third Section presents a competitive 
baseline for measuring the efficiency of outcomes in order to explain 
the relative efficiency of concentrated and atomized patent ownership. 
A.  The Rise and Possible Fall of the “Patent Troll” 
Patent trolls have triggered a firestorm of protest that may be 
reaching a crescendo. Leading technology firms condemn PAEs’ rent-
seeking behavior,48 and countless newspaper articles criticize patent 
aggregation and assertion.49 The President has opined that PAEs “don’t 
actually produce anything themselves. They’re just trying to essentially 
leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort 
some money out of them.”50 The Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit has 
referred to their business model as patent trolling.51  
PAEs typically buy patents that would otherwise lie dormant on 
account of their probable invalidity, vague scope, and age.52 After 
amassing an arsenal of such IPRs, they hold up businesses that 
independently invent and market technological products that consumers 
                                                                                                                     
 48. See, e.g., Comments of Google, Blackberry, Earthlink & Red Hat to the Federal Trade 
Commission and U.S. Department of Justice on Patent Assertion Entities (Apr. 5, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0049.pdf; 
Congress Must Rein in “Terrorist” Patent Trolls, Say Senior Executives, MLEX, Mar. 14, 2013 
(subscription required); David Ingram, Corporate Counsel Push Antitrust Response to Patent 
Trolls, THOMSON REUTERS, Mar. 15, 2013 (subscription required). 
 49. See, e.g., Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Patent Wars Unite US Left and Right, FIN. 
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013, 12:14 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cfe0736e-2a9f-11e3-8fb8-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3HPjTUoA9 (subscription required); Floyd Norris, Extracting a Toll 
from a Patent “Troll,” N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/business/extrac 
ting-a-toll-from-a-patent-troll.html; Patent Reform in America: Trolls on the Hill, ECONOMIST 
(Dec. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21591206-congress-takes-aim-patent-
abusers-trolls-hill; David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-will-sue-an-
alert-to-corporate-america.html; see also Ashby Jones, Patent ‘Troll’ Tactics Spread, WALL ST. 
J. (July 8, 2012, 8:46 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023032922045 
77514782932390996. 
 50. Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-
patent-trolls-protect-american-innovation (quoting President Barack Obama’s February 14, 2013 
“Fireside Hangout”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51. Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Make Patent Trolls Pay in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-
trolls-pay-in-court.html. 
 52. See, e.g., Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. 
& TECH. 59, 94 (2013); Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in 
Patent Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 
34 (2010); Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory, Comment, The Troll Next Door, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 295 (2007). 
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value.53 The cost of litigation, uncertainty as to the outcome of judicial 
proceedings, and a nearly endless supply of patents available to PAEs 
induce many, perhaps most, innovators to settle for large amounts of 
money.54 This Article demonstrates that PAEs routinely extract far 
greater royalties than the economically optimal amount.  
An Intel executive coined the expression “patent troll” in 2001 to 
characterize these practices,55 which bear “indicia of extortion.”56 Since 
then, the problem of offensive patent assertion by NPEs has become 
increasingly acute. Between 2010 and 2012, the percentage of all 
patent-infringement lawsuits that PAEs brought rose from 29% to 
62%.57 The America Invents Act, which limited joinder,58 introduced 
post-grant review,59 and bolstered inter partes review,60 may bear some 
responsibility for this uptick.61 Regardless, NPEs now file a majority of 
all patent-infringement suits, and the scale of PAE activity has risen 
sharply.62 
In most cases, PAEs do not actually need to file suit to extract 
lucrative sums. In 2012, for instance, PAEs may have threatened more 
than 100,000 firms with such proceedings.63 An influential study—
albeit one criticized for not estimating efficiency losses and for loosely 
defining NPEs—estimates that NPEs imposed $29 billion of direct costs 
on U.S. businesses in 2011 alone.64 Interestingly, when they prevail at 
                                                                                                                     
 53. See, e.g., Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 53, 77–79 (2014); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur 
Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 744 (2012). 
 54. See, e.g., Phil Goldberg, Policy Brief, Stumping Patent Trolls on the Bridge to 
Innovation, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST. 5–7 (Oct. 2013), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/10.2013-Goldberg_Stumping-Patent-Trolls-On-The-Bridge-To-Innova 
tion.pdf. 
 55. Todd Klein, Comment, eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: 
The Supreme Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007). 
 56. See Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 57. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 1, 5 
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
 58. 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). 
 59. Id. § 321. 
 60. Id. § 311. 
 61. See, e.g., David J. Kappos, Facts Show Patent Trolls Not Behind Rise in Suits, 
LAW360 (Jan. 15, 2014, 12:39 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/501142/facts-show-patent-
trolls-not-behind-rise-in-suits (subscription required); Adam Mossoff, GAO Report on Patent 
Litigation Confirms No “Patent Troll” Litigation Problem, TRUTH ON MARKET (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2013/12/17/gao-report-on-patent-litigation-confirms-no-patent-troll 
-litigation-problem/. 
 62. See, e.g., James Bessen, ALL the Facts: PAEs Are Suing Many More Companies, 
PATENTLY-O (Jan. 28, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/facts-suing-companies.html. 
 63. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 57, at 1, 6.  
 64. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Essay, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 389 (2014). For criticism, see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, 
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trial, PAEs tend to win larger damages amounts than practicing 
companies.65 NPEs enjoy a lower success rate, however, at trial. A 2011 
study concluded that NPEs won only 9.2% of cases litigated to 
judgment (including default judgments) compared to the approximately 
40% success rate that practicing entities achieve at trial (not including 
default judgments).66 Once an NPE files suit, it receives an award just 
24% of the time.67 These facts suggest that, on average, PAEs assert 
weaker patents.68 Of course, PAEs are likely to handpick the best IPRs 
from their larger portfolios to assert in court.69 Thus, these statistics 
suggest that PAEs often—though perhaps not always—aggregate 
weaker than average patents. 
The growing scale of PAE assertion reflects the lucrative nature of 
the business model and the ease of entry into the business.70 The fuel 
that sustains PAE assertion is an enormous universe of unenforced 
patents, which is disproportionately comprised of computer-
implemented and business-method claims.71 Because IT products 
                                                                                                                     
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, Essay, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
425, 431–33 (2014). 
 65. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2119–20. 
 66. Allison et al., supra note 15, at 693 tbl.8 & fig.4, 694. 
 67. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE 
HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE—1995–2012, at 5 (2013), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us 
/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
 68. See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2120; Arti K. Rai, Improving 
(Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 503, 505 
(2013). But see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Essay, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing 
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 451 (2014) (“There is some evidence 
that NPEs settle more quickly compared to other patent holders, which could indicate the 
possibility of nuisance settlements. . . . But there is also empirical evidence that the patents 
asserted by NPEs are similar to patents asserted by practicing entities.”). 
 69. See, e.g., J.P. Mello, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 388, 394–95 (2006); cf. Malcolm T. “Ty” Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, Patent Valuation: 
Aren’t We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by 
Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM, 9 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 194, 203 (2010) (opining that, as a general matter, “the strongest 
patents are less likely to make it into the litigation data pool” and that “[i]n contrast, patents with 
value just below the strongest of patents may find themselves in litigation more often”). 
 70. See, e.g., Jack Ellis, A Game of Scale, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., July/Aug. 2012, at 2, 2, 
available at http://acaciaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/IAM_54-Acacia_digital.pdf 
(observing that Acacia Research, a PAE, has been “a runway success. In just three-and-a-half 
years, its market cap has shot up from around US$90 million to a staggering US$1.75 billion”); 
Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, Intellectual Ventures Generated $700 Million in Revenues in 2010, 
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2011, 5:32 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/intellectual-ventures-
2010-revenue-2011-3. 
 71. See David A. Fitzgerald II, Saving Alternative Dispute Resolution in Patent Law: 
Countering the Effects of the Patent Troll Revolution, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 345, 348–
49 (2008); Anna Mayergoyz, Note, Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 241, 259–60 (2009).  
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combine thousands of discrete and potentially patent-eligible 
components, IT manufacturers are particularly vulnerable.72 Some 
commentators estimate that over two million patents are presently active 
in the United States.73 Smartphone patents account for nearly 12% of 
them.74 These features of today’s system, coupled with the risk of treble 
damages for willful infringement,75 make it infeasible for innovators to 
scour the prior art and to secure clearing positions before marketing 
next-generation devices.76 A recent paper estimated that it would take 
two million patent attorneys working full time to compare every 
software patent issued in a year to every firm’s products, costing $400 
billion—almost twice the value of the software industry.77  
Two factors are disproportionately responsible for this phenomenon. 
The first is a 1998 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group.78 In State Street, the Federal Circuit held that software and 
business methods are patent-eligible if they produce “a useful, concrete 
and tangible result.”79 That holding, combined with the “dot.com boom” 
that soon followed, resulted in the PTO’s issuance of a deluge of such 
patents.80 To make matters worse, examiners often failed to scrutinize 
the prior art surrounding such applications, causing many obvious or 
non-novel patents to issue.81 Compounding the problem, the Federal 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 39, at 613. 
 73. E.g., Dennis Crouch, How Many US Patents Are In-Force?, PATENTLY-O (May 4, 
2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/05/how-many-us-patents-are-in-force.html (calculating 
that about 2.1 million U.S. patents were in force as of May 1, 2012). 
 74. See RPX CORP., supra note 13. 
 75. The Federal Circuit, however, has ameliorated the risk of willful infringement when 
an innovator merely happens to see a patent before manufacturing what later transpires to be an 
infringing product. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 76. See, e.g., Kevin R. Davidson, Retooling Patents: Current Problems, Proposed 
Solutions, and Economic Implications for Patent Reform, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 425, 454 
(2008). 
 77. Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 289, 304–05 (2012). 
 78. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 79. Id. at 1373, 1375 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994), 
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 
S. Ct. 3218 (2010)). 
 80. See, e.g., Andrea Lynn Evensen, Comment, “Don’t Let the Sun Go Down on Me”: An 
In-Depth Look at Opportunistic Business Method Patent Licensing and a Proposed Solution to 
Allow Small-Defendant Business Method Users to Sing a Happier Tune, 37 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 1359, 1364 (2004). 
 81. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What If There Were a Business Method Use 
Exemption to Patent Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 262 (citing sources for the 
proposition that the “low patent quality for business method patents may have resulted from 
PTO inexperience with the subject matter of business method patents, from the inaccessibility to 
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Circuit requires minimal disclosure for computer-implemented 
inventions.82 Many software patents now claim methods far broader 
than what their respective inventors actually invented, with several such 
patents claimed in functional terms.83 
These background conditions make large-scale patent aggregation 
and ex post assertion possible. As noted, the public backlash against 
what many perceive to be increasingly objectionable behavior by PAEs 
is growing loud. However, PAEs have not sat idly by in the face of this 
public criticism,84 nor are they bereft of support, as some commentators 
have sought to justify offensive patent assertion by NPEs.85 PAEs claim 
to build fluid technology-transfer markets by providing the necessary 
resources to assert deserving patents whose original owners could not 
afford to monetize them and by connecting those upstream inventions to 
their downstream uses.86 Part II of this Article scrutinizes that 
justification and finds it wanting.  
More generally, PAEs undermine their claim to legitimacy by 
engaging in questionable practices, including those that hinder 
transparency. Some PAEs positively invest in secrecy, a phenomenon 
most plausibly explained by an attempt to magnify hold-up of 
independent inventors and marketers of technology.87 For instance, 
                                                                                                                     
examiners of business method prior art due to its relatively recent patentability, and from an 
overly relaxed nonobviousness standard”). 
 82. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 120–21 (2009). 
 83. See Lemley, supra note 17. 
 84. See, e.g., Michelle Quinn, ‘Patent Trolls’ Launch a Lobbying Defense in D.C., 
POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2013, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/patent-trolls-launch-
a-lobbying-defense-in-dc-97592.html. 
 85. See, e.g., James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An 
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 
190 (2006); Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of 
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 150 (2010).  
 86. See, e.g., About Us, ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., http://acaciaresearch.com/about-us/ 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“An intermediary in the patent market, Acacia facilitates efficiency 
and delivers monetary rewards to the patent owner.”); FAQ, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, 
http://www.intellectualventures.com/about/faq (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“Our mission is to energize 
and streamline the invention economy while producing a financial return for our investors.”); Our 
Services, CONVERSANT INTELLECTUAL PROP. MGMT., http://www.conversantip.com/our-services/ (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2015) (formerly Mosaid Technologies) (“We’re in the business of making 
innovation more rewarding. Through our IP management services, sophisticated partnership 
models and innovative programs, we help our global partners realize the full value from their IP 
assets.”); What We Do, IPNAV, http://www.ipnav.com/what-we-do/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) 
(“IPNav’s integrated, end-to-end solution turns idle IP assets into revenue streams. Using its 
proprietary Patent Monetization Platform, IPNav unlocks the value trapped in our clients’ IP 
portfolios . . . .”). 
 87. See, e.g., infra Subsection II.A.3.c.ii (exploring this phenomenon through a 
hypothetical example). 
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Intellectual Ventures has reportedly created more than 1300 shell 
companies88 to mask patent acquisitions from unsuspecting operating 
firms and, perhaps, to divorce the entities it uses to bring lawsuits from 
the companies it uses to hold other IPRs. 
For all the harm that PAEs inflict on large technology companies, 
the last straw politically may have been their recent targeting of small 
businesses and individuals.89 A prominent example is MPHJ 
Technology Investments, a PAE that sent threatening letters to more 
than 16,000 individuals and small businesses across America.90 The 
conduct of MPHJ and other similar PAEs has triggered legislative 
action at the state and federal level.  
Significant movement is now underway to arrest the most egregious 
PAE practices. In May 2013, Vermont became the first state to pass a 
law targeting PAEs.91 Its “Bad Faith Assertions of Patent 
Infringements” bill permits victims of illegitimate patent enforcement to 
sue the firm that asserted that IPR and authorizes the state’s Attorney 
General to bring civil actions against perceived trolls.92 In January 
2014, New York’s Attorney General entered into a consent decree with 
MPHJ.93 The decree, which followed on the heels of a lawsuit against 
MPHJ by the Vermont Attorney General, prohibited the company from 
using deceptive tactics against New York businesses.94 Under 
investigation by the U.S. government but not content to stay on the 
defensive, MPHJ boldly sued the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on 
January 13, 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 2, https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-
review-stlr/online/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf. 
 89. See, e.g., Jim Bessen, Op-Ed, How Patent Trolls Doomed Themselves by Targeting 
Main Street, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 12, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/09/op-ed-how-patent-trolls-doomed-themselves-by-targeting-main-street/. 
 90. Jan Wolfe, Accused Patent Troll Takes Aim at FTC, Settles with N.Y. AG, AM. LAW. 
(Jan. 14, 2014), available at http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202638423763 
(LexisNexis subscription required). 
 91. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts the Nation’s First Anti-Patent Trolling Law, 
FORBES (May 22, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/05/22/vermont-
enacts-the-nations-first-anti-patent-trolling-law/. 
 92. H. 299, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Vt. 2013), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§§ 4195–99. 
 93. See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman 
Announces Groundbreaking Settlement with Abusive “Patent Troll,” (Jan. 14, 2014), available 
at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-groundbreaking-settlement-
abusive-“patent-troll”. 
 94. See id.; see also Dennis Crouch, State of Vermont’s Demand Letter Case Against 
MPHJ Continues, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 12, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/08/vermonts-
against-continues.html. 
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Texas, seeking declaratory relief that the FTC was violating MPHJ’s 
constitutional right to enforce its patents.95 
Several government studies of PAE activity exist. In 2011, the FTC 
released a report concluding that “[e]ven if PAEs arguably encourage 
invention, they can deter innovation by raising costs and risks without 
making a technological contribution.”96 In summer 2013, the President 
published a report making recommendations aimed at limiting PAE 
hold-up.97 Later that year, the FTC announced a Section 6(b) study on 
PAEs’ effects on innovation and competition.98 That action followed a 
public workshop on PAE activity that the FTC held in conjunction with 
the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division on December 10, 2012.99 
On December 17, 2013, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
regarding “Protecting Small Businesses and Promoting Innovation by 
Limiting Patent Troll Abuse.”100 Congress is presently weighing 
legislative reform aimed at curbing the worst abuses. It may pass the 
“Innovation Act,” which would increase transparency and award 
prevailing defendants of patent-infringement suits their costs and 
attorneys’ fees.101 
The Supreme Court is also involved. The Court has issued at least 
fifteen patent opinions since 2004.102 Many of those decisions limit 
patent hold-up. The Court has limited the availability of injunctive 
relief;103 made it easier to show that a claimed invention is obvious;104 
held that a licensee has standing to challenge the validity and 
infringement of a patent for which it pays royalties;105 clarified that 
abstract inventions are unpatentable;106 found that a product or method 
lacking an “inventive concept” does not claim patentable subject 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Complaint at 2, 5, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 6:14-cv-11 
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2014). 
 96. FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 9. 
 97. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 57. 
 98. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities 
and Their Impact on Innovation, Competition (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine-patent-assertion-entities-their-impact. 
 99. See Public Workshops: Patent Assertion Entity Activities, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
 100. Hearing on Protecting Small Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent 
Troll Abuse, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/
protecting-small-businesses-and-promoting-innovation-by-limiting-patent-troll-abuse. 
 101. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3(b)(1), § 8(a)(1) (2013). 
 102. John W. Cox & Joseph Vandegrift, The Supreme Court Is Paying Attention to Patent 
Law Again, LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/425426/the-supreme-
court-is-paying-attention-to-patent-law-again. 
 103. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006). 
 104. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). 
 105. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 121–22, 137 (2007). 
 106. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010). 
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matter;107 clarified that a naturally occurring DNA sequence is 
unpatentable;108 and held that patentees always have the burden of 
persuasion to establish infringement, even when they defend a 
declaratory-judgment action.109 In the 2014 Term, the Court issued an 
important opinion holding that computer-implemented inventions based 
on intermediated settlement are abstract and therefore patent-
ineligible.110 Given the extent to which PAEs rely on software patents, a 
ruling that materially cabins the patentability of such technologies could 
undermine the threat that many PAEs pose to business. 
Such reforms would certainly ameliorate PAE hold-up; however, 
they would not be a panacea.111 This Article explores whether an 
antitrust solution exists to counter the most extreme instances of PAE 
hold-up. If such a solution exists, it would also be an additional measure 
with which to counter large-scale, offensive patent aggregation. Such a 
limitation would be particularly valuable to many of today’s most 
successful technology firms, which the largest PAEs tend to target. 
Nevertheless, legislative reform will not likely eliminate the threat that 
such comprehensive patent aggregation and assertion can pose. 
B.  The Optimal Rate of Patent Assertion and Independent 
Innovation 
To understand the economics of patent aggregation, one must 
appreciate how the contemporary patent regime operates. The system’s 
essential features are well known. A patent’s defining characteristic is 
the right to exclude.112 An inventor of a novel, useful, and nonobvious 
technology who sufficiently discloses his insight receives a twenty-year 
monopoly.113 This monopoly is rarely an economic one—enabling the 
sustainable and profitable raising of prices above competitive 
levels114—rather, it is an exclusive privilege to practice the claimed 
invention.115 Most patents have little to no value because they claim just 
one of many equally good alternatives to achieving a particular end or 
because they read on a product or process for which there is little or no 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).  
 108. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119–
20 (2013). 
 109. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014). 
 110. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).  
 111. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, There Are Two Patent Troll Problems. The House Bill Only Fixes 
One of Them., WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/12/04/there-are-two-patent-troll-problems-the-house-bill-only-fixes-one-of-them/. 
 112. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
 113. See id. §§ 101–03, 154. 
 114. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43 & 43 n.4 (2006). 
 115. See Andrew Chin, Research in the Shadow of DNA Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 846, 866 (2005).  
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consumer demand.116 The owners of such patents lack market power 
because if they raise price significantly above marginal cost, consumers 
will be unwilling to pay for a license. Consequently, rightsholders have 
only litigated 1.5% of patents.117 
Two nuances shape the patent right. First, a patent does not grant an 
absolute right to exclude as might exist if enforcement costs were equal 
to zero or if the state policed infringement on patentees’ behalf. Instead, 
patents grant their owners the ability to ask a court to order another to 
stop practicing their inventions, to pay reasonable royalties, or (in the 
event of willful infringement) to fork up treble damages.118 This 
difference is important. The cost of litigating a patent to judgment 
hovers between $5 million and $8 million,119 which makes filing suit a 
loss-generating endeavor unless the exclusive right is sufficiently 
valuable. Second, even assuming that patentees have the means and 
inclination to enforce their rights, patents confer probabilistic rights to 
exclude only.120 Although patents enjoy a statutory presumption of 
validity,121 many of them are in fact invalid.122 This is primarily because 
the PTO lacks the resources to scrutinize every application; thus, it 
routinely errs.123 Empirical studies of validity show that courts strike 
down approximately half of all patents litigated to judgment.124  
These findings likely reflect selection bias because they apply to the 
less than 2% of patents that are ever litigated to judgment.125 Whether 
                                                                                                                     
 116. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4, 20 ex. 8 (1995) [hereinafter IP LICENSING 
GUIDELINES]. 
 117. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on 
Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009). 
 118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–84 (2012).  
 119. See, e.g., STEVEN M. AUVIL & DAVID A. DIVINE, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW 
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at 35; Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic 
Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 450 (2010); Wayne B. Paugh, The 
Betrayal of Patent Reexamination: An Alternative to Litigation, Not a Supplement, 19 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 177, 207 (2009). 
 120. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75 
(2005) (“[A] patent does not confer upon its owner the right to exclude but rather a right to try 
to exclude by asserting the patent in court.  When a patent holder asserts its patent against an 
alleged infringer, the patent holder is rolling the dice.” (citation omitted)). 
 121. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
 122. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of 
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007). 
 123. See id. at 47. 
 124. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 120, at 76; see also supra note 15. 
 125. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical 
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2005); Arti K. Rai, Allocating 
Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 920 (2004); see 
also Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of 
Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 19 (2013). 
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the effect of any such bias means that the roughly 50% invalidity rate is 
representative of the broader universe of patents is the subject of 
debate.126 On one hand, parties are more likely to settle infringement 
claims founded on the strongest patents, such that empirical studies of 
IPRs subject to validity determinations may fail to account for high-end 
patents. On the other hand, the weakest patents are also unlikely to 
make it to a validity determination.127 Absent the PAE phenomenon 
discussed in this Article or other strategic scenarios, firms are reluctant 
to spend millions of dollars asserting demonstrably invalid patents.128 
Furthermore, evidence shows that litigated patents are stronger on 
average than non-litigated patents.129 Most recently, evidence has 
emerged that the most litigated patents, usually asserted by PAEs, are 
invalidated or held not infringed far more often than once-asserted 
patents.130 Regardless, it is widely accepted that active patents are 
subject to chronic rates of invalidity.131 This seems particularly true of 
software patents that NPEs assert.132 
Is this phenomenon a good thing? The fact that the patent system serves 
an explicit constitutional mandate makes answering this question 
conceptually feasible. Specifically, the law recognizes patents “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.”133 
To judge the status quo, then, one might fruitfully ask whether less than 
complete enforcement is attractive from the perspective of spurring 
innovation. If (i) patents were valid and they disclosed cutting-edge 
technology at the time of invention; (ii) search, identification, and 
negotiation costs were absent; and (iii) the social and private costs of 
litigation were zero, then the optimal rate of patent assertion would 
indeed be 100%. However, the world operates differently today, which 
complicates the analysis. Due to imperfections in the patent system, the 
                                                                                                                     
 126. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 125, at 5–6. 
 127. See Shrestha, supra note 85, at 143. 
 128. Id. at 120.  
 129. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439–40 (2004) (arguing 
that “litigated patents tend to be much more valuable than others on average” and defining 
valuable patents as “individual patents that produce substantial economic benefit to their 
owners”). 
 130. See Allison et al., supra note 15, at 680, 687 tbl.3. 
 131. A 2006 study found that once courts consider validity, noninfringement, and 
enforceability, “accused patent infringers have been winning patent infringement suits at a rate 
of three to one.” Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3–4 (2006). 
 132. See Allison et al., supra note 15, at 680 (“NPEs and software patentees 
overwhelmingly lose their cases, even with patents that they litigate again and again.”). 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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perfect rate of patent assertion is less than 100% (though, most 
assuredly, greater than 0%). 
To start, copying is unusual rather than typical.134 Only about 10% 
of patent-infringement complaints even allege copying.135 This matters 
because if downstream implementers of technology routinely 
appropriate others’ inventions, then one could justify incomplete 
enforcement based only on litigation costs and possible invalidity. Yet, 
to the extent that independent invention is responsible for marketed 
technology, limited patent enforcement offers public-goods benefits.136 
Independent invention coming hot on the heels of a patent can suggest 
that the claimed technology may have been obvious in light of the prior 
act.137 An economic purpose of the § 103 condition is to deny protection 
to inevitable inventions.138 
In certain fields, patents often fail both to disclose technology in a 
meaningful way and to percolate knowledge.139 Where a patent 
document spurs no further action—that is, where the patentee does not 
commercialize her technology or license it so that another can learn and 
put that invention into practice—it does not advance the constitutional 
foundation on which the patent system rests.140 To the extent that these 
characteristics are present, underenforcement limits the “tax” effects of 
patents on downstream innovation, which is the principal source of 
social welfare.141 
Less than total patent enforcement is desirable in certain industries. 
Conceived in an age when, “if you put technology in a bag and shook it, 
it would make some noise,”142 the patent regime now barely resembles 
                                                                                                                     
 134. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1424. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 887 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman 
eds., 2005).  
 137. See generally Peter E. Gratzinger, Was the Telescope Obvious? An Inquiry into 
Simultaneous Invention, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 71 (2011) (exploring whether 
simultaneous invention suggests obviousness). 
 138. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (providing that “[a] patent . . . may not be obtained . . . if 
the . . . claimed invention . . . would have been obvious”). For this author’s larger discussion of 
this point, see Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian 
Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897 (2009). See generally Tun-Jen Chiang, 
A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 42–56 (2008) 
(discussing the history and development of the obviousness requirement for patentability).  
 139. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 803, 839 n.140 (2007); Teresa M. Summers, Note, The Scope of Utility in the 
Twenty-First Century: New Guidance for Gene-Related Patents, 91 GEO. L.J. 475, 489 (2003). 
 140. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 9, 51. 
 141. See id. at 52–53 & n.13. 
 142. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property 
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 585 
(1999). 
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its earlier incarnation. Gone are the days when a single patent covered a 
larger machine. Today, electrical inventions account for the lion’s share 
of patents coming out of the PTO,143 and the most litigated patents lie in 
the fields of software and telecommunications.144 Mobile telephony is 
by far the largest field of patenting, possibly accounting for as much as 
one-quarter of all issued U.S. patents in 2013.145 These modern 
developments have profound implications for how a patent system 
initially designed for physical devices should accommodate very 
different forms of invention. 
Above all, innovation in industries like telecommunications, IT, and 
semiconductors takes place at the level of discrete subcomponents that 
one must combine in large numbers to create an end product.146 This 
characteristic is of utmost importance because it triggers coordination 
problems.147 Economists have long recognized that divided ownership 
of complementary goods creates inefficiencies in the form of royalty 
stacking or Cournot-complements effects.148 If the builder of a 
telecommunications device must purchase 10,000 patents to avoid 
infringement and a different firm owns each patent, then it must identify 
the 10,000 relevant patents and their owners and conduct that many 
separate negotiation sessions. Additionally, each patentee has an 
incentive to hold out and to demand as the price of its blessing an 
amount trivially less than the expected value of the device.149 As 
discussed below, the Supreme Court tempered this danger in its 2006 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC decision, which made injunctive relief 
in the event of holdout unlikely.150 Nevertheless, strategic behavior can 
allow patentees to extract greater royalties than they could have 
                                                                                                                     
 143. See Annette I. Kahler, Examining Exclusion in Woman-Inventor Patenting: A 
Comparison of Educational Trends and Patent Data in the Era of Computer Engineer Barbie®, 
19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 773, 788 & 789 fig.3 (2011).  
 144. See Allison et al., supra note 117, at 3. 
 145. See CHETAN SHARMA, MOBILE PATENTS LANDSCAPE: AN IN-DEPTH QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
5 (2d ed. 2013), available at http://www.chetansharma.com/MobilePatentsLandscape_2013.htm. 
 146. See Kahin, supra note 12, at 390; see also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD 
PATENT REPORT: A STATISTICAL REVIEW F.1 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/
ipstats/en/statistics/patents/wipo_pub_931.html#f1 (noting a larger number of patent 
applications in these categories). 
 147. See, e.g., Rudy Santore et al., Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of 
Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence, 53 J.L. & ECON. 167, 167–69 (2010), 
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/600078?origin=JSTOR-pdf. 
 148. Id. at 168–69; see also George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the 
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 917–18 (2011). 
 149. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 1993, 1995. 
 150. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding that a 
plaintiff must meet a four-factor test for the court to award injunctive relief); see also Lemley & 
Melamed, supra note 30, at 2141 (“The eBay decision raised the bar for the issuance of 
injunctions in infringement suits brought by both trolls and practicing entities . . . .”). 
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commanded ex ante—before the firm implementing the technology 
began investing in its chosen product design.151 This suggests that, to 
the extent that patent enforcement promotes social welfare, aggregators 
of patents in these fields could enhance efficiency by internalizing 
positive externalities that would otherwise bias pricing decisions 
upward and by reducing transaction costs.152 
Three critical assumptions underlie that possibility. The first is that 
the price of the patented technology reflects both the licensee’s design-
around options and the claimed invention’s incremental benefit 
compared to the next-best alternative. The royalty commanded must not 
be based on lock-in and hold-up. The second is that efficiency requires 
that every patent be asserted. The third is that such enforcement 
achieves royalties that flow to upstream patentees in a way that 
magnifies incentives to invent and commercialize new technologies. 
These assumptions are unlikely satisfied in many of today’s patent-
heavy industries outside of biopharmaceuticals and chemicals. 
Collectively, the preceding account of today’s patent regime sets the 
scene for this Article’s analysis of patent aggregation. To emphasize, 
nothing in this Article means to convey skepticism as to the virtue of 
IPRs. Patents are often socially justified, and are important instigators 
of innovation, especially in the biopharmaceutical setting where the 
economic, public-goods justification for IPRs is compelling.153 
Similarly, it does not follow that increasing the scale or efficacy of 
patent enforcement will reduce welfare. To the contrary, building and 
licensing patent portfolios could advance social welfare in the right 
circumstances. This Article endeavors to show, however, that a 
particular brand of patent accumulation harms static and dynamic 
efficiency and that competition laws may serve a prophylactic role in 
constraining such aggregation. Accordingly, antitrust has long ensured 
that patentees do not usurp their time-limited exclusive rights to acquire 
market power beyond the grant of the original patent. 
The critical insight is that the timing of patent licensing informs its 
desirability. Ex ante technology transfer—taking place prior to an 
implementer’s design and introduction of an accused device—is 
presumptively efficient because it diffuses novel engineering insights in 
                                                                                                                     
 151. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2178. 
 152. See id. at 2157. This Article disagrees with Lemley and Melamed’s conclusion that 
large-scale PAEs like Intellectual Ventures may be alleviating hold-up problems.  
 153. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 14 (2003); see also Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling 
the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 764 (2002); Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy 
Signals: Capturing Private Information for Public Benefit, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012); 
Rajnish Kumar Rai & Srinath Jagannathan, Do Business Method Patents Encourage 
Innovation?, 2012 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 10. 
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a manner that innovators can profitably use to build new products.154 
Most importantly, ex ante licensing ensures that market prices are 
competitive in that they reflect the technical virtues of the sold 
technology.155 Ex post licensing, however, can be problematic156 
because of lock-in.157  
Once a firm has implemented and sunk capital into a new product 
design, a patentee can demand a royalty tied to the threat of shutting 
down the firm’s operations rather than to the incremental value of the 
licensed patent.158 The severity of this ex post threat depends on the 
injury that the patentee can inflict through the patent system. An 
injunction, for instance, can permit hold-up of this nature. eBay has 
made such relief an improbable remedy for PAEs, which is why the 
International Trade Commission has become a forum of choice for 
PAEs in light of its granting of exclusion orders comparable to 
injunctions.159 As discussed below, PAEs may have means beyond 
seeking injunctive relief to impose outsize threats on their targets ex 
post. 
Nevertheless, the desirability of patent licensing is not as simple as 
“ex ante is good; ex post is bad,” nor are ex post royalties exceeding the 
ex ante price invariably inefficient. There are important subtleties to the 
appropriate economic analysis of such licensing. In particular, a 
patentee’s ability to impose a hefty wallop on licensees in the ex post 
world does not in itself mean that monopolistic price extractions are 
inefficient. The law-and-economics literature addressing the effects of 
property, liability, and nonalienability rules shows that the law’s chosen 
means of protecting ownership rights can impact the ex ante behavior of 
stakeholders.160 Specifically, an injunction or a damages award 
exceeding the parties’ subjective value of the property induces ex ante 
bargain rather than ex post damages proceedings.161 All else equal, ex 
ante negotiations are superior to those taking place after the fact; thus, 
                                                                                                                     
 154. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 40. 
 155. See Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 471. 
 156. E.g., FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 50–54; see also Scott Morton 
& Shaprio, supra note 28, at 487. 
 157. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 158. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 8. 
 159. See Mike Heins, Selling Congress on eBay: Should Congress Force the ITC to Apply 
the eBay Standard?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 589, 590–91 (2013); Xun (Michael) Liu, Note, Joinder 
Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertions Away from Small Businesses, 
19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 507–08 (2013). 
 160. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: 
An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) (discussing the different economic effects 
of property and liability rules). 
 161. See id. at 756–57. 
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disproportionate ex post damages can be desirable.162 But that is not 
true when transaction costs preclude effective bargaining ex ante.163 
This is the case for many industries in which the patent system currently 
plays a material role.164 Insurmountable bargaining costs result from the 
numerosity, ambiguity, and suspect validity of patents in certain 
sectors.165 
In short, ex post licensing that results in monopoly—greater than ex 
ante royalties—is desirable only if it incentivizes parties to bargain ex 
ante. The problem, however, is that such ex ante technology transfer is 
not feasible in certain industries.166 PAEs have zeroed in on this 
infeasibility to achieve a lucrative business model founded on hold-up. 
The nature of an industry and the relationship between ex ante and ex 
post licensing in that setting help in understanding the economics of 
PAE aggregation. 
This discussion sets the backdrop for understanding the economic 
ramifications of mass-scale accumulation and assertion of IPRs. As 
indicated above, if NPEs bought and licensed promising patented 
technologies that did not exist in commercialized products, they would 
almost certainly promote social welfare. PAE conduct, however, is the 
antithesis of such efficient aggregation and licensing. This Part 
concludes by extrapolating some key insights that inform the discussion 
that follows. Then, to illustrate the economic effect of PAE activities, 
the next Part explores the consequences of patent accumulation in 
distinct hypothetical universes.  
C.  The Competitive Ex Ante Pricing of Proprietary Technology and Ex 
Post Hold-Up 
To explore the relative efficiency of concentrated and atomized 
patent ownership, one must first identify a competitive baseline for 
measuring the efficiency of outcomes. As applied to the licensing of 
IPRs, this identification is challenging. Typically, economists equate 
competitive outcomes with price equaling the marginal cost of a firm’s 
production.167 Applied to the licensing of technology, marginal cost 
may be modest once one identifies the relevant parties. When one 
introduces IPRs granting an exclusive right to practice a claimed 
                                                                                                                     
 162. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of 
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2096 (1997). 
 163. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–09 (1972). 
 164. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 88, at 20. 
 165. See id. at 24.  
 166. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 54–56. 
 167. E.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 33 
(2005). 
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invention, however, the marginal-cost baseline is no longer apt. In 
some—though by no means all—circumstances, that exclusive right 
grants the patentee the sustained ability to restrict output or to raise 
price in a relevant market.168 In those settings, the “competitive” 
reference point is one in which the patentee exercises significant market 
power.169 This quality complicates the comparison of pre- and post-
patent aggregation. 
The antitrust issue is whether the patentee can achieve a positive 
change in market power beyond the level that he enjoyed prior to the 
scrutinized restraint. The critical time period is prior to 
commercialization of the technology claimed in the relevant patent 
because of the absence of capital investment and hence lock-in by 
potential licensees. In implementing a chosen product design, a firm 
suffers nonredeemable costs that prevent it from substituting for an 
alternative design at the same cost that was available prior to 
investment. That lock-in enables the holder of an IPR to extract greater 
value than it could have before the potential licensee invested in 
building its chosen technology. 
To explain why lock-in enhances the holder of a potentially 
infringed patent’s market power, this Article explores what limits exist 
before third parties implement their claimed technologies. Specifically, 
what constraints limiting patentees’ power over price ex ante cease to 
exist, or exist only in diluted form, ex post? 
Several qualities limit patentee power ex ante. Envision a 
downstream innovator (the firm or potential licensee) that has not yet 
chosen and sunk capital into its next-generation product line. The price 
that each owner of a relevant patent can demand turns on the value of 
her claimed technology vis-à-vis the next best technological substitute. 
If a nonproprietary process is available to the firm’s engineers, then the 
owner of a patent claiming a different technology that performs the 
same function will have no market power and could not command a 
price greater than zero. However, even without a substitute for a 
proprietary technology, three factors limit the price that the patentee can 
demand.  
First, the company may be able to design its planned good so that it 
does not implicate a particular technology.170 The ease of its ability to 
“invent around” the patent limits the other’s value. If an alternative 
design would be equally appealing to customers and simple to achieve, 
the patentee could charge no more than a vanishingly small amount. 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44–45 (2006); Chin, supra 
note 115, at 866.  
 169. See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 44–45.  
 170. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
cf. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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Second, if an alternate design is either technically infeasible or not 
appealing to consumers, the patentee may have monopoly power.171 The 
amount of power depends on the anticipated market value of the new 
product line. The company would never pay more for a technology than 
the expected value of the product that features it.172 Third, the patentee’s 
cost of enforcing its right to exclude limits market power. The average 
patent case now costs millions of dollars to litigate to judgment.173 
Where a reasonable royalty for a particular invention would be modest, 
litigation costs limit enforcement and constrain market power.  
This is the ex ante world where patent licensing is efficient. 
Innovative companies building new goods can use state-of-the-art 
technologies, consumers benefit from superior products, and patentees 
derive pecuniary returns tailored to the incremental value of their 
claimed know-how over those of the next-best-available technology.  
Still, this state of affairs is imperfect. The expense of realizing one’s 
patent rights deprives some deserving inventors of a monetary reward. 
No less seriously, the patent system’s many imperfections stymie 
downstream innovators’ ability to identify and obtain technical 
solutions to problems. Many patents claim more than what their 
inventors actually discovered—especially for means-plus-function 
claims174—and the pace of innovation quickly renders many claimed 
technologies defunct. Nevertheless, holders of outdated patents can, and 
regularly do, claim infringement. Furthermore, the number of IPRs 
makes identifying and negotiating with each owner of a patent that 
reads on a planned good infeasible. In an optimal system, manufacturers 
of technological products could quickly and affordably identify all 
patentees who claim technologies reading on their considered product 
designs, determine whether those patents are valid and would read on 
those designs, and bargain with each owner for a competitively 
determined royalty. That aspiration is a world apart from the reality of 
today’s system. Nevertheless, even with today’s flawed patent regime, 
some ex ante licensing takes place, and when it does, it is presumptively 
efficient. 
II.  PATENT AGGREGATION UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF 
OPTIMALITY: AN EXPLANATORY MODEL 
This Part explores the economic consequences of patent 
accumulation. Using a hypothetical example subject to changing 
                                                                                                                     
 171. See Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 314.  
 172. See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent 
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 744 n.85 (2011). 
 173. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 905, 907–08.  
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assumptions, it illustrates how the welfare effects of patent aggregation 
are circumstance-dependent.  
Consider a downstream innovator, Alpha, which wishes to develop a 
new-generation product comprising 4000 discrete technical functions.175 
Alpha must combine all 4000 to create its desired good. The great 
majority—3900—of the requisite technologies are either known in the 
art or susceptible to independent invention by Alpha’s engineers.176 One 
hundred of these functions, however, are cutting-edge and not easily 
solved in-house. Nevertheless, they are subject to patented solutions, 
“Tier A” patents, upon which Alpha could draw. If Alpha availed itself 
of those 100 technologies without securing licenses, it would infringe 
all of them. That conclusion holds true regardless of whether Alpha 
copied or successfully solved those technical challenges independently 
because there is no clean-room defense in patent law.177 Alpha cannot 
alter its product design to avoid Tier A patents. 
Each of the 3900 remaining technical functions is subject to a 
potential infringement claim, which may or may not be well-founded. 
Each of 2000 of those functions potentially implicates a “Tier C” patent, 
which is of suspect validity. Any Tier C patent has a mere 1% chance 
that it is valid and that it reads on Alpha’s planned design. Another 
1000 of the 3900 functions may infringe “Tier B” patents, which 
arguably read on more novel aspects of the planned product line’s 
architecture. Each one has a 30% chance of validly reading on the 
chosen design.  
Each of the 900 residual functions is subject to two competing 
patented solutions that, though technically distinct, perform perfectly 
interchangeable functions. No alternative technical solutions are 
available for those 900 operations. These patents are definitely valid, so 
in manufacturing its desired next-generation good, Alpha would 
necessarily infringe 900 patents if it did not obtain licenses.  
Alpha could alter its product design to avoid the Tier B and C 
patents. In other words, it would be possible at modest cost for Alpha to 
“design around” any of those patents if asserted during the engineering 
                                                                                                                     
 175. Many technological products combine thousands of discrete technologies, so this is a 
reasonable assumption. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 1992. 
 176. Again, this is a realistic assumption. Independent invention is the norm in most 
industries in which the patent system plays a material role. Research published in 2012 by the 
U.S. National Science Foundation shows that only a minority of innovators in all surveyed 
industries consider patents to be “very important” to their R&D efforts. JOHN E. JANKOWSKI, 
BUSINESS USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION DOCUMENTED IN NSF SURVEY 1–2 tbl.1 
(2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf12307/nsf12307.pdf. 
 177. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (providing no defense for independent invention or 
unintentional infringement). See generally Vermont, supra note 30 (discussing whether this 
aspect of the patent regime makes economic sense). 
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phase. Alpha could not, however, avoid Tier A or competing patents. 
They are indispensable to realizing the product that Alpha envisions.  
In short, Alpha’s proposed future product implicates the following 
patented technologies: 
 
Alpha’s Product Design
Total number of discrete technologies needed: 4000 
Tier A Patents (100% valid) implicated: 100 
Tier B Patents (30% valid) implicated: 1000 
Tier C Patents (1% valid) implicated: 2000 
Functions subject to two competing patents (100% 
valid): 
900 
 
The starting point for analyzing this hypothetical is a world of 
perfect patent disaggregation where a different patentee has licensing 
authority to each of the 4900 proprietary technologies. The expected 
value to Alpha of implementing its next-generation good, free of 
royalties or damages, is V. The efficient-baseline price for the relevant 
patents is PA1E . . . PA100E; PB1E . . . PB1000E; PC1E . . . PC2000E; 
PCOMP1E . . . PCOMP1800E. That sum reflects the price upon which Alpha 
and each patentee would agree ex ante, which accounts for factors such 
as the likelihood of invalidity and noninfringement, the expected value 
of the potentially infringing product, alternative technologies, and 
design-around feasibility. The royalty that Alpha actually pays each 
patentee is R1 . . . R4000, where 0 ≤ R1 . . . R4000 ≤ V.178 
A.  Perfect Aggregation and Zero Enforcement Costs: The Royalty-
Stacking Problem 
The first step in this analysis is to chart the relative effects of 
aggregation and disaggregation under idealized circumstances and 
compare the outcome to the social-welfare optimum. As noted above, 
begin by assuming complete atomization. Courts unfailingly award 
damages equal to what the parties would have agreed upon ex ante.179 
Suppose that enforcement (i.e., litigation) costs are zero and that 
granting the owner of a valid, infringed patent a sum equal to the ex 
ante market price for that claimed technology enhances welfare.180 Also 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Alpha would never rationally pay more in royalties than what it expects to gain by 
manufacturing and selling the product for which it licensed technology.  
 179. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 180. In other words, assume away imperfections in the patent system that allow inventors 
to obtain twenty-year exclusive rights over inevitable inventions that were on the cusp of being 
realized anyway and that competition and other inducements drive independent of IPRs. This 
assumption also excludes the possibility that patents detract from dynamic efficiency by 
allowing inventors of quickly outdated technologies to lay claim to future technologies in 
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assume that Alpha can freely determine which patents are invalid and 
which, if valid, would read on its future array of goods. 
In this zero-transaction-cost environment, Alpha can identify and 
negotiate with each of P1 . . . P4900 (i.e., all owners of all relevant 
patents) at no cost. Parties bargain in the shadow of law such that their 
expectation in eschewing negotiations in favor of litigation sets the 
range of terms upon which they will rationally agree.181 The only other 
factors establishing the parties’ bargaining range are the parties’ 
walkway prices. For Alpha, that price is V—ε—[R1 + R2 + . . . + 
R4000]—i.e., the expected value of commercializing its desired product 
minus the royalties paid to other licensors minus epsilon (a vanishingly 
small amount representing the requisite de minimis profit). For each 
patentee whose opportunity cost in licensing is zero, the minimum price 
at which the patentee will license is ε. Assuming no judicial error, the 
court would award damages equal to what the parties would have 
agreed upon without litigation, thus making that “competitive” price the 
ceiling and floor for the parties bargaining before the fact. 
That means that Alpha will acquire licenses to Tier C and B patents 
at a price less than or equal to its design-around costs, discounted by the 
probability of invalidity and noninfringement. Thus, the Tier B royalty 
rate will be thirty times larger than that for Tier C patents. Royalties for 
those IPRs will therefore be modest.  
What of the 1800 “competitive” patents? As each pair of separately-
owned competitive patents discloses equally effective solutions to the 
900 differing functions, the model of Bertrand competition seems 
applicable.182 Price competition between each pair of fungible 
proprietary technologies will thus produce an equilibrium price equal to 
marginal cost.183 Here, the cost of licensing is zero by assumption, so 
under disaggregation, Alpha will take its pick of competitive patents for 
free. 
Prices for competitive and Tier A patents, however, will be 
significantly positive. Each such patent is indispensable. Alpha and each 
such patentee will negotiate a royalty reflecting V, the expected market 
value of the design product, and (to a degree) the number of other 
patents that Alpha must combine to obtain a clearing position for the 
future product. Because courts would award this amount ex post, the 
parties will be indifferent between contracting ex ante and letting the 
                                                                                                                     
environments of rapid cumulative innovation. See supra Section I.C. for a discussion of what 
the ideal or “competitive” price means in a market for the licensing of proprietary technology. 
 181. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2021–22. 
 182. For a discussion of the Bertrand competition model, see MANFRED NEUMANN, 
COMPETITION POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE 59–61 (2001). 
 183. See id. 
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courts establish that price ex post. By assumption, both avenues are 
costless and produce the same royalty. 
Yet, as explored in the prior Part, the “competitive” price in this 
environment is a range, rather than a point, due to the market power 
inherent in a valid patent that covers a valuable product or process. 
Even making the outlandish assumptions applied here—zero bargaining 
costs, zero litigation costs, and no judicial error—the ideal outcome will 
not ensue under disaggregation.  
The economic relationship between the 4000 discrete technologies 
needed to make Alpha’s envisioned product is one of complementarity. 
That means that decreasing the price of any one technology increases 
the demand for all of the others, and vice versa—the reason being that, 
in the presence of a property rule or suitably draconian liability rule, 
Alpha needs licenses to all valid and infringed patents.184 
Economists have long recognized the monopoly problem that 
emerges when economic complements are subject to diffuse 
ownership.185 Because each holder of a patent reading on Alpha’s 
design can veto the product’s introduction if a property or severe 
liability rule applies, each one has a monopoly.186 In exercising that 
power, however, self-interested patentees will ignore the fact that they 
are charging higher than a competitive price, which harms all other 
holders of relevant patents.187 Economists refer to this phenomenon as 
royalty stacking or the Cournot-complements problem.188 Its presence is 
undesirable because it results in relatively low output and high prices.189  
Even in the absence of transaction costs, litigation costs, and judicial 
error, the result of diffuse patent ownership in this example is that the 
price of each of the 100 Tier A patents will exceed what it should be. 
The surcharge will have one of two negative effects. First, it may 
bestow a windfall on some or all patentees and cause allocative-
efficiency losses in the downstream product market. Second, it may 
cause the collective price of Tier A patents to exceed the expected value 
of Alpha’s new product, resulting in a complete loss of value for all 
stakeholders. 
The essential insight here is that there is a loss in net value under 
disaggregation, meaning that a Pareto improvement through free 
contract is possible. Specifically, complete vertical integration among 
                                                                                                                     
 184. When the law protects ownership interests with a property rule, it awards injunctions 
in the event of an unauthorized incursion. In contrast, under a liability rule, courts will award 
monetary damages only. See Mulligan & Lee, supra note 77, at 315. 
 185. Supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 186. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2009. 
 187. See id. at 2010. 
 188. Id. at 2013.  
 189. See id.  
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the owners of Tier A patents would eliminate the royalty-stacking 
problem. Assuming the absence of transaction costs, the parties will 
avail themselves of the opportunity for mutually beneficial exchange. 
Thus, with free bargaining, it follows that each complementary Tier A 
patent, PA1 . . . PA100, will reside under the ownership of a single 
patentee.  
In this model, aggregation of Tier A patents is efficient because it 
lowers net price and increases output. Crucially, there is no possibility 
of ex post hold-up because of the assumed absence of judicial error and 
litigation costs. In other words, no patent aggregator could use the 
litigation process to impose asymmetric costs on recalcitrant users of 
technology, inducing them to pay more than the competitive price. Note 
that aggregating Tier B and C patents would have no effect here 
because no royalty-stacking problem arises from disaggregation of these 
patents. For the Cournot-complements problem to emerge, owners of 
the relevant property rights must have market power. For reasons 
discussed above, Tier B and C patentees have none under the 
assumptions of this ideal scenario. 
Similarly, separate ownership of the 1800 competitive patents will 
not create royalty-stacking problems even though any pair of 
competitive patents may complement another pair of competitive 
patents reading on a different function because each holder of a 
competitive patent lacks market power.190 Aggregating these substitute 
patents, however, would be anticompetitive. If one entity acquired those 
1800 patents—or even just a single pair reading on one function—the 
price constraint posed by competition would evaporate. Prices would 
rise to the same level as those of Tier A patents, a price level 
appropriate only for proprietary technologies for which no substitutes 
exist. Between one entity holding all 1800 competitive patents and 900 
entities each holding a pair of patents reading on one function, the 
former is preferable because the Cournot-complements problem is 
present in the latter setting. 
In this example, the effects of patent aggregation depend on the 
economic relationship between the patents acquired. In the presence of 
patentee market power, aggregating complementary inputs needed to 
manufacture a downstream product enhances welfare, but combining 
substitute patents detracts from it. These basic principles explain why 
horizontal acquisitions generally attract antitrust scrutiny and vertical 
ones typically do not. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 190. See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 116, at 4.  
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B.  Introducing Modest Transaction and Litigation Costs 
In practice, one cannot expect costless bargaining, free litigation, and 
no judicial error. Moving away from the ideal case toward more 
realistic assumptions, this Article will introduce positive transaction and 
litigation costs but continue to suppose that courts can unfailingly 
determine the “competitive price.” Although the judiciary endeavors to 
calculate patent damages in a manner reflecting the ex ante technical 
contribution of the infringed patent,191 imputing perfection to that 
process goes too far. Nevertheless, adhering to that assumption isolates 
the role of transaction and litigation costs on the economics of patent 
aggregation.  
Relaxing the assumptions of costless bargaining and free litigation 
profoundly affects the analysis. One effect is patentee 
undercompensation because the private cost of enforcement may exceed 
the expected value of filing suit.192 Patent accumulation may in theory 
ameliorate this shortcoming by achieving scale economies in litigation, 
thus reducing the average cost of patent enforcement. Aggregation, as 
before, could potentially reduce the royalty-stacking problem and 
diminish transaction costs required for the downstream firm to secure a 
clearing position. At the same time, the countervailing problem of 
patentee overcompensation and downstream hold-up is avoided by 
virtue of the assumed absence of judicial error and because litigation 
costs are symmetric. This Article will now explore the bases for these 
conclusions.193 
1.  Patent Atomization and the Undercompensation Problem 
Once more, the initial state of affairs is one of perfect 
disaggregation. Relax the assumption of zero transaction costs to the 
point that the cost of Alpha’s bargaining with any one patentee is 
modest—positive, but easily surmountable. Thus, Alpha can readily, 
                                                                                                                     
 191. E.g., Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) 
(calculating damages by reference to “[t]he amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a 
licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if 
both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement”), modified, 466 F.2d 
295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 192. The conclusion that a patentee will file suit when the expected value of doing so is 
positive depends on the assumption that the patentee is risk neutral. If the patentee is risk averse, 
the undercompensation problem will worsen.  
 193. Two related matters are worthy of note. First, in a world with positive transaction 
costs but without litigation costs and judicial error, no private licensing contracts would take 
place. Downstream innovators would copy or independently invent, and the courts would 
efficiently set the price of use. Second, if litigation costs were positive (and symmetric) but 
transaction costs and judicial error were again absent, no litigation would take place, and the 
parties would efficiently reach terms. Neither of these situations exists outside of academic 
models. 
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albeit at positive expense, identify any relevant patent, its owner, and 
the likelihood of validity and infringement. The absence of judicial error 
remains, but litigation costs are now positive. Assume that the cost to a 
patentee of enforcing its IPR and the cost of defending such a lawsuit, 
“C,” is constant across the universe of patents. Litigation costs are 
therefore symmetric. 
The expected damages in bringing suit are DA, DB, and DC for Tier 
A, B, and C patents respectively. The expected damages in suing on any 
of the 900 competing patents are zero. DB = 30DC. The relationship 
between the return and private costs of suing is DA > DB > C > DC. 
Thus, in the event that Alpha infringes these patents, only the owners of 
Tier A and B patents would sue. As the cost of enforcing their rights 
exceeds the expected damages, owners of Tier C patents will not sue. 
That fact makes the price of a license for Alpha to Tier C patents zero 
under disaggregation. 
Under atomization, the first shortcoming is patentee 
undercompensation. In the hypothetical, Tier C patent owners as a 
group receive suboptimal rewards. At the individual level, twenty 
holders of valid and infringed Tier C patents are deprived of their due 
return, though the remaining Tier C patentees rightly get nothing. If 
patentees are risk neutral, it is irrelevant to social welfare whether (a) 
each Tier C patentee gets a sum equal to 1% of the inventive 
contribution or (b) the twenty holders of valid and infringed Tier C 
patents get 100% of the incremental technical benefit back, and the 
remaining 1980 receive nothing.  
So, there is an under-reward problem. Litigation costs are to blame 
for this, not concentration of patent ownership. All manner of legal 
rights are underenforced due to real-world enforcement costs. Lower 
assertion of legal rights is generally desirable compared to what the 
proper rate of enforcement would be in an ideal universe of zero 
transaction costs because filing a lawsuit implicates all manners of 
social and private costs. This may render lesser enforcement and 
undercompensation more desirable than the first-best paradigm. 
Yet, the cost of enforcement—C, in this hypothetical—is the average 
cost of asserting a patent only if litigants enforce one at a time. A patent 
aggregator may be able to achieve scale economies in assertion. Many 
of the activities involved in litigating a case on one patent can overlap 
with other patents, so pooling several patents into one case may 
eliminate duplicative expense. Suppose that adding more patents to a 
case does not add any costs beyond those involved in litigating the first 
patent. In other words, suppose that there are perfect scale economies in 
patent enforcement. The average cost of patent assertion in a case is 
then C/n, where n is the number of patents asserted in the case. 
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Although C > DC, it does not follow that C/n > DC when n > 1. In 
this hypothetical, if a patent accumulator purchases ten Tier C patents, 
the average cost of enforcement may be less than the expected damages. 
It follows that aggregation in this situation may remedy 
undercompensation by holders of patents that were unprofitable to 
assert individually in light of the litigation costs implicated in doing so. 
Note, however, that the problem of patent underenforcement in this 
hypothetical is modest—limited to patents of dubious validity and 
infringement. In this example, as in the real world, one is likely to assert 
strong IPRs when they read on valuable products, making the danger of 
inadequate inventor compensation modest. 
2.  Positive Litigation Costs and the Question of Patentee 
Overcompensation 
In the simple case of no litigation costs and no judicial error, 
patentees could not extract more than the marginal technical 
contribution of their proprietary method or product over the next best 
alternative. Courts would not award them a larger amount of money in 
damages, and they could not inflict harm on a patentee separate from or 
beyond that damages amount. By assumption, the cost of defending a 
lawsuit was zero. 
Assuming no judicial error, does the calculus change when one 
introduces positive litigation costs? The answer is no, due to the 
supposition that litigation costs are symmetric. The cost to Alpha of 
defending, and to a patentee of bringing, a lawsuit is C. However, if a 
patent aggregator’ litigation costs were lower than Alpha’s, Alpha 
would rationally settle for more than the ex ante competitive value of 
the patent. This is the first insight into the possibility of hold-up and 
patentee overcompensation. 
3.  Disaggregation and Wasteful Bargaining Costs  
Now consider the transaction-cost question. Here, the shortcoming 
associated with dispersion of the relevant patents is plain. To secure 
licensing permission, Alpha must identify and bargain with each of 
3100 patentees (Alpha needs to solve 900 technical functions as to each 
of which there are two competing patentees, but because courts would 
award reasonable royalties of zero for them, the patentees will not assert 
them). At that scale, even bargaining costs that are vanishingly small at 
the individual level quickly become preclusive. If “TCm” represents the 
transaction costs of bargaining with a single patentee, m, it is a 
reasonable assumption that TC1 + TC2 + . . . + TC3100 > V. In other 
words, the transaction costs involved in securing licensing permission 
over the full universe of relevant patents exceed the expected value of 
marketing the next-generation product. If the relevant IPRs remain 
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subject to diffuse ownership, Alpha’s choice is either to abandon the 
project or to infringe and deal with any lawsuits after the fact. 
Here, the benefits of patent aggregation on reducing transaction costs 
are clear. By amassing complementary patents, a patent accumulator 
would reduce transaction costs by creating a one-stop shop for 
licensing. As in the simple hypothetical above, the aggregator would 
also eliminate the royalty-stacking problem.  
Again, aggregating the competing patents would eliminate 
competition, creating market power where there was none. What if a 
single aggregator were to combine all of the 3100 complementary 
patents and only one patent covering each of the 900 functions subject 
to competing patents? Might there still be harm to competition? In 
offering a blanket license to its 4000-patent portfolio (i.e., by bundling), 
the aggregator might seem to eliminate the competitive constraint that 
the 900 patents it does not hold imposed on the pricing for the 900 
interchangeable patents in its portfolio. Price theory suggests that such 
monopoly leveraging is impossible in fixed-proportions tying of this 
kind.194 If anticompetitive effects nevertheless arose, a solution would 
be to impose a duty under the antitrust laws to preserve independent 
licensing. Such a solution might be to award discounts to the blanket 
license. This would preserve competition while facilitating the 
transaction-cost benefits of combining complements.  
C.  Real-Life Complications: Judicial Propensity to Err and High 
Litigation Costs 
In the real-world case, patent aggregation is most complex and 
potentially problematic. The negative consequences associated with 
certain forms of IPR aggregation here flow from its interaction with 
three features that define the innovation process and technology-
licensing markets: litigation costs in the millions of dollars; judicial 
error, specifically, unpredictable patent-infringement damages awards 
that exceed competitive, ex ante benchmark royalties;195 and high 
bargaining costs. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 194. See Daniel A. Crane & Joshua D. Wright, Can Bundled Discounting Increase 
Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 209 (2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1632968 (arguing that monopolists cannot charge a higher price 
for a bundle simply because it contains a monopoly item, as a rational monopolist will already 
have charged the profit-maximizing price for the item). But see Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled 
Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 400–01 
(2009) (arguing that fixed-proportions tying must combine with a strong positive demand 
correlation and a lack of substantial tied foreclosure in order for monopolists to lack leverage). 
 195. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2143–44. 
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1.  Background Conditions Necessary to Understand the Effects 
of Aggregation 
First, the private cost to a party of litigating patent claims to 
judgment is typically in the realm of $5 million.196 Enforcement costs of 
that magnitude create a de facto fair-use aspect to the modern patent 
system because it rarely pays for holders of weak (likely invalid) 
patents, which arguably read on peripheral aspects of an accused device, 
to file suit. The expected value of doing so is likely negative, except for 
strong patents that lay colorable claim to a lucrative product. This 
dynamic undercompensates some upstream patentees and permits a 
certain degree of free-riding downstream by those commercializing 
technology.197  
The extent to which this is problematic depends on the probable 
validity of the unenforced patents and the prevalence of independent 
downstream invention. Likely, a certain degree of underenforcement is 
socially desirable given many patents’ chronic invalidity and that the 
lion’s share of innovation that gives rise to marketed technology is not 
copied but independently realized. Today, there appears to be a public-
goods benefit to incomplete enforcement of weak patents. 
Second, damages awards for infringement fluctuate wildly, 
especially in front of juries.198 Since eBay, courts award injunctions less 
often, and they are especially reluctant to grant such relief to NPEs.199 
Nevertheless, the probability that a court will enjoin a firm that an NPE 
sued for infringement is greater than zero.200 But a remedy need not be 
equitable to devastate a defendant’s bottom line. The median damages 
                                                                                                                     
 196. See AUVIL & DIVINE, supra note 119, at 35. 
 197. Cf. Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. 175, 208 (2011).  
 198. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1665–66. 
 199. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 394 (2006) (holding that 
injunctive relief is not automatic in the event of patent infringement, but it depends on the 
traditional four-factor test in equity). Lower courts quickly got the message. See also, e.g., 
Amado v. Microsoft Corp., No. SA CV 03-242 DOC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96487, at *31 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2007), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600, at *17 
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007); z4 
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 439 (E.D. Tex. 2006).  
 200. Post-eBay, courts have sometimes awarded NPEs permanent injunctions. See, e.g., 
Joyal Prods. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531, at *43 
(D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009), aff’d, 335 Fed. App’x 48 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Commonwealth Scientific & 
Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007); see 
also Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 n.28, 622 (D. Del. 2008) 
(granting a permanent injunction even though the patentee was no longer making products 
incorporating the infringed technology), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and vacated in part, 576 
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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award from 2007 to 2012 was $4.9 million, but there were three awards 
greater than $1 billion in 2012 alone.201 Many outlier judgments have 
little apparent relationship to the marginal benefit that the infringed 
patent offered over alternative technologies ex ante, but they often seem 
to track the infringing device’s market value. Thus, although one of the 
Georgia-Pacific factors seems to track the efficient benchmark of ex 
ante licensing, awards deviate from that amount in practice. A particular 
oddity of the damages-calculation process responsible for this 
phenomenon is that, after finding that the patent is valid and infringed, 
the factfinder must assume that, in negotiating ex ante, the licensor and 
licensee would have presumed that the probability of validity and 
infringement was 100%.202 That is an unrealistic account of real-life 
negotiations ex ante and an economic mistake.203 
It should be no surprise to learn that juries and judges err. As the 
awards occupying the upper spectrum of damages represent a material 
portion of even successful companies’ profits, the prospect of an 
uncertain damages sum is unnerving. It is not rare for leading 
innovators to settle pending patent litigation for eight- or even nine-
figure amounts. 
Third, transaction costs are not merely high but are often fatal to ex 
ante licensing.204 Outside of the biopharmaceutical and chemical 
industries, technology products typically implicate thousands of discrete 
technical functions. Such goods suffer a concomitant vulnerability to an 
equal number of separate claims of patent infringement. Illustratively, 
RPX Corp., a defensive patent-buying fund, has concluded that more 
than 250,000 active patents are relevant to contemporary 
smartphones.205  
Factors beyond the sheer number of patents drive preclusive 
bargaining costs. Vague claims, indeterminate scope, and questionable 
validity characterize many patents outside of the life sciences.206 The 
sheer number and obscurity of patents in technology industries mean 
that innovators today typically ignore patents altogether in designing 
                                                                                                                     
 201. PWC, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT 
CASES PROLIFERATE 3, 5, available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf. With respect to outlier damages on 
the high end, the Federal Circuit often reduces them on appeal or the parties settle for 
significantly less than the amount awarded. Id. at 3. 
 202. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 203. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2019–20. But see Doug Lichtman, 
Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1040–41 (2010) (arguing that 
the assumption of validity and infringement is necessary to compensate the patentee for 
incurring the risk of assertion). 
 204. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2149 n.140. 
 205. RPX CORP., supra note 13, at 59. 
 206. Lemley, supra note 17, at 930–31. 
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and developing new products.207 The transaction costs needed to secure 
freedom of operation ex ante—before firms devote capital to marketing 
a chosen product line—are prohibitive. Consequently, innovators today 
generally invent independently of IPRs and deal with any infringement 
claims after the fact.208 Ex ante patent licensing typically takes place 
only when a patent is prominent and indispensable to implementing a 
particular good or in the rare case where it offers a solution to an 
otherwise intractable problem. 
That dynamic is crucial for understanding the effects of patent 
aggregation in the real world. Now, return to the hypothetical example 
of Alpha, incorporating the preceding three features of the 
contemporary patent system. The analysis begins, once more, with 
atomization. The welfare effects of patent accumulation in this realistic 
scenario depend heavily on the likelihood of patent validity, the 
presence of ex ante design alternatives, and the timing of the patent 
assertion. Recall that the key performance metric is the “competitive” 
deal that parties would strike ex ante in a low-transaction-cost setting, 
where the prospect of design-around, the expected value of the proposed 
new technology product, the downstream technology firm’s alternative 
investment options, competition from substitute patents, and countersuit 
risk between operating firms all cabin patentee market power. 
2.  Efficient Aggregation: Tier A Patents 
A situation in which aggregation is not only efficient given realistic 
assumptions, but where the fact or threat of ex post hold-up can also 
serve a desirable function is illuminative: consider Tier A patents. These 
are not only valid; they can solve Alpha’s engineering challenges. 
Alpha can either copy their teachings or attempt to solve the problems 
that those patents solve independently. Either way, Alpha will infringe, 
though in the former case the lack of a license would translate into 
treble damages for willful infringement and a possible injunction.209 In 
the latter instance, outlier damages and a possible injunction are real 
dangers. Alpha thus has a powerful incentive to secure licensing 
authority ex ante. 
a.  The Problematics of Hold-Up and Disaggregation 
In the event of infringement, each Tier A patentee could hold up 
Alpha. In securing an injunction or credibly threatening to obtain one, 
each patentee would lay claim to the value of Alpha’s entire product, 
not just the subcomponent on which the asserted patent reads. If the 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Id. at 934. 
 208. Id. at 934–35. 
 209. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–84 (2012). 
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court erroneously awarded excessive damages, the economic effect 
would be similar. In either event, the sum that Alpha will rationally pay 
no longer reflects the ex ante contribution of the infringed technology; 
rather, it reflects the harm that a Tier A patentee can inflict after the 
fact. As the latter amount exceeds the former, Tier A patentees can 
extract supracompetitive royalties—sums exceeding the efficient ex 
ante benchmark.  
Note, however, that a single patentee cannot use litigation costs to 
inflate further the settlement amount that Alpha would pay ex post. If 
the plaintiff and defendant experience identical costs, “C,” then a Tier A 
patentee’s threat to impose a cost of C on Alpha carries an equal cost 
for the plaintiff, and thus simply expands the parties’ bargaining range. 
For instance, if the expected damages from going to trial on a Tier A 
patent are $25 million and the costs of litigation are $5 million for both 
the plaintiff and the defendant, a bargaining range exists between $20 
and $30 million if the parties are risk neutral. The patentee is as likely to 
settle for less than the damages amount as Alpha is to settle for more. 
Furthermore, because IPR ownership is atomized, the Tier A patentee 
cannot threaten to inflict losses via serial assertion to punish Alpha for 
recalcitrance. 
Nevertheless, the amount that Alpha is likely to pay each Tier A 
patentee ex post is greater than the ex ante benchmark amount. Is this 
problematic? Generally it would be, but not here. In this situation, 
economists typically recommend using a property rule to protect an 
entitlement. Tier A patents are definitely valid and infringed, but the 
courts have limited ability to calculate accurately the appropriate 
measure of damages. The parties have superior information about the 
value that they respectively place on the claimed invention and its role 
in the new downstream product. The law should therefore induce parties 
to bargain before the fact by imposing a disproportionately high penalty 
on an entity invading an entitlement without permission. An injunction 
or inflated damages award carries the same effect—either remedy 
makes it unprofitable for a party to appropriate unilaterally another’s 
property right, thus inducing ex ante bargain. Such voluntary contracts 
produce superior results. 
But this conclusion raises three important issues. First, is ex ante 
bargain necessarily better here? The fact that Alpha will rationally seek 
permission ex ante does not ensure that the parties will actually agree to 
the idealized “efficient” or “competitive” benchmark price. That may 
seem counterintuitive since this Article defines that metric by the terms 
upon which the parties would have agreed ex ante as opposed to ex 
post. The complication lies in the feedback effect from the parties’ 
expectations in eschewing ex ante negotiations and instead litigating ex 
post. As mentioned, people bargain in the shadow of law.  
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If the courts will award the owner of each Tier A patent excessive 
damages of, say, $100 million after the fact, does that mean that each 
such patentee will refuse to license ex ante for less than that amount? 
The answer is no because choices still exist ex ante that evaporate ex 
post. At the planning stage, Alpha is under no obligation to press ahead 
in its planned product design. It could invest its capital in an alternative 
product not implicating the Tier A patents, thus denying the owners of 
those IPRs a licensing opportunity. Alpha and Tier A patentees are both 
better off if they negotiate a mutually satisfactory deal. Even here, the 
choice constraint limits ex ante royalties.  
Second, the conclusion that harsh ex post penalties efficiently induce 
ex ante bargaining only holds true if transaction costs are surmountable. 
In practice, they may not be, especially when patent ownership is 
atomized. If Alpha simply cannot identify and negotiate with the holder 
of every Tier A patent, then injunctive relief or damages greater than ex 
ante royalties would be inefficient—a form of undesirable hold-up. The 
point here is that injunctions and disproportionate damages awards are 
punitive—designed to deter wrongful conduct. But in the presence of 
high transaction costs, failure to obtain licenses ex ante is not wrongful, 
it is inevitable. 
Third, the Cournot-complements problem discussed above still 
applies in the presence of disaggregation. The ex ante royalty for each 
Tier A patent, as agreed upon in a market, will be larger under 
atomization than under concentrated ownership. If a different firm owns 
every such patent, none of those companies will consider that insisting 
on higher royalties may, combined with other high prices charged by 
other patentees, scupper the entire project by rendering negative the 
expected value of the product design to Alpha. 
b.  Desirable Aggregation of Valid Patents 
Under disaggregation, the transaction costs involved in identifying 
and negotiating ex ante with the 100 Tier A patentees may sully the 
entire project if Alpha perceives that the damages risk is too severe. The 
same may be true if, ignoring the positive externalities attendant upon 
its pricing decision, each Tier A patentee charges more than it should. 
Then, the total royalties obligation may swamp the benefits to Alpha of 
proceeding with its project, thus leaving Alpha and all Tier A patentees 
worse off. 
Patent accumulation may solve both deficiencies. If an aggregator 
acquired all Tier A patents, the result would be reduced transaction 
costs for Alpha and a lower overall price due to the elimination of 
Cournot-complements effects. However, that positive conclusion rests 
on the critical assumption that Alpha must know or be realistically 
capable of learning about the Tier A patents and who owns them. If a 
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firm acquires all such patents and actively seeks to license them to 
downstream technology firms building next-generation products, an 
unambiguous increase in efficiency results. Conversely, if an aggregator 
combined patents and affirmatively invested in concealing them, it 
would aggravate rather than remedy the royalty-stacking problem and 
hold-up threat associated with IPR disaggregation in high-transaction-
cost environments. 
Issues of concealment and strategic hold-up aside, might there be an 
antitrust problem associated with the assignment of all Tier A patents to 
a single owner? The answer is no. By definition, every such patent is 
valid and infringed, and each is necessary to make Alpha’s desired new 
product a reality. The Tier A patents are economic complements rather 
than substitutes, and by assumption, each would be enforced regardless 
of who owns it. Given those assumptions, a fixed amount of monopoly 
power flows from the original Tier A patentee to the assignee 
aggregator.  
Thus, aggregation is generally desirable for complementary patents 
that are valid and infringed. Such IPRs are necessary inputs in the 
downstream commercialization process, so the public policy question is 
how to ensure their licensing at the lowest social cost and at a price 
reflecting their ex ante value. Dispersed ownership of such patents 
hinders that goal, while aggregation in the hands of a firm focused on 
licensing ex ante (albeit under threat of ex post suit) is desirable. This 
holds true under real-life assumptions of high transaction costs, judicial 
error, and expensive litigation. That conclusion, however, depends on 
assertion of the valid, infringed patents and on downstream 
implementers of technology identifying those patents in the design 
phase ex ante.  
3.  Problematic Aggregation: Tier B & Tier C Patents 
In the real world, IPRs bearing the qualities of Tier A patents are in 
the minority. Many patents, and especially those involving business 
methods and computer-implemented processes, are of uncertain validity 
and scope. In the parlance of the hypothetical exercise of this Part, Tier 
B and C patents represent such IPRs. What does the disaggregated 
world of Tier B and C patents look like, given realistic assumptions of 
high transaction costs, judicial error, and multimillion-dollar litigation 
costs? 
a.  The Social-Welfare Benefits of Limited Weak-Patent 
Assertion 
The answer is limited enforcement. Tier C patents, in particular, will 
sit dusty on shelves because no owner of such a standalone patent 
would rationally spend millions of dollars enforcing a dud right. After 
42
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 24
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/24
2015] ANTITRUST LIMITS ON TARGETED PATENT AGGREGATION 817 
 
all, each one has a 99% chance that the court will find it invalid or not 
infringed. From a public policy perspective, this might be somewhat 
problematic; however, when downstream innovators have no need to 
rely on such patents’ teachings—when in-house engineers can readily 
solve the technical problem that the patent purports to address—the 
underenforcement has little to no effect on long-run consumer welfare. 
To the extent that certain patents neither result in consumable 
technology reaching the market nor inform follow-on innovation, they 
make a minimal contribution to society. That conclusion is magnified 
when the PTO should not have granted the patent on account of its 
obviousness, invalidity, nonutility, or insufficient disclosure. 
What of the owners of Tier B patents? If such patentees tried to 
assert their rights ex ante, they would enjoy minimal pricing power 
because Alpha can, at modest cost, design around any asserted Tier B 
patent, thus avoiding any infringement claim. Informing Tier B 
patentees of that fact, Alpha will either take a license at a low royalty 
that properly reflects the de minimis contribution that the Tier B patents 
make vis-à-vis other technological designs or it will eschew a license 
and slightly alter its design.  
Ex post, however, some Tier B patentees may more effectively assert 
their rights. One might question why Alpha would expose itself to this 
risk knowing the unpredictability of patent damages and the price of 
litigation. The answer lies in the realistic assumption that transaction 
costs are preclusive ex ante. It would make no economic sense for 
Alpha to identify and negotiate with 1000 Tier B patentees. While those 
Tier B patentees who do sue after the fact when Alpha’s product is 
successful may be able to extract greater than ex ante royalties, three 
factors temper their ability to do so. First, each such patentee must 
spend $5 million to assert its right with the knowledge that there is a 
70% chance that it will recover nothing. Second, due to disaggregation, 
no such patentee can pool the risk of loss among a portfolio of patents 
whose risk profiles are not correlated, so they are likely risk averse. 
That makes Tier B patentees even less likely to file suit. Third, to the 
extent that a Tier B patentee competes in a product market with Alpha, 
filing suit would invite a patent-infringement countersuit from Alpha.  
The combined effect of these features is to limit enforcement. Some 
lawsuits take place, and Tier B patentees as a group are technically 
undercompensated. Nevertheless, the absence of copying and failure of 
such patentees to license ex ante and thus to commercialize their 
patented insights makes this limited enforcement of mild concern at 
worst and socially beneficial at best. In short, disaggregation generates a 
public-goods benefit, taking the form of weak-patent underenforcement.  
This leads to the central concern of this Article: strategic patent 
aggregation, followed by ex post assertion, founded on generating 
43
Devlin: Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
818 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
substantial hold-up power. IPR accumulation can harm social welfare 
by allowing an aggregator to command substantially greater royalties 
than dispersed owners of the relevant patents could have obtained. As 
these patent acquisitions generate otherwise absent market power, 
causing prices to exceed the efficient ex ante benchmark, they may 
generate antitrust concerns without countervailing justifications. In 
certain cases of PAE hold-up, such justifications are likely elusive. 
b.  Anticompetitive Patent Aggregation of Extremely Weak 
Patents 
This Subsection begins with the most extreme case: Could a PAE 
extract significantly greater than ex ante royalties by amassing IPRs as 
weak as the Tier C patents in this Part’s illustrative example? It is 
important to begin with this hard question because the efficiency and 
antitrust cases against patent accumulation are strongest when an 
aggregator can realize monopoly power ex post that did not exist ex 
ante. This analysis demonstrates that a patent aggregator may amass 
individually worthless patents of dubious quality, yet command 
extraordinary sums for a license to its portfolio. How does this straw-
into-gold alchemy work? 
Envision a firm versed in the idiosyncrasies of today’s patent 
system. It understands that ex ante licensing in technology-transfer 
markets, though efficient, has limited worth from a patentee’s 
perspective because several factors limit an IPR-holder’s power over 
price. These include licensee design-around options and investment 
alternatives. It knows that, ex post, a prospective licensee has locked 
into its new product line and thus abandoned those previously available 
choices. It also knows that this sunk investment infuses likely valid and 
infringed patents with considerable market power, but that its impact on 
individually weak patents is more modest because the cost of assertion 
is justifiable over a single IPR only if the odds of recovery are 
attractive. The firm appreciates further that the owner of a potentially 
infringed patent, be it strong or weak, may not sue if it competes in the 
same market as the alleged infringer. Defensive portfolios owned by 
operating companies and covering rivals’ products abound in high-
technology markets, so one suit begets another in response. 
Out of this milieu, the firm eyes an opportunity. First, it bypasses 
any countersuit constraint by adopting a business model that does not 
practice any technology. Such companies, known as NPEs, are 
invulnerable to patent-infringement countersuit. They are also tailor-
made for relatively cheap litigation because their exposure to discovery 
costs is modest. Second, the firm (now NPE) identifies existing or soon-
to-be-realized products that are lucrative. These goods become its 
targets. Third, the firm amasses many weak patents that have some 
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tenuous relationship to those products. Because the ex ante market value 
of such IPRs is minimal, the NPE can buy those IPRs at low cost. 
Fourth and critically, the firm abstains from approaching prospective 
licensees until they are actively marketing the products that the NPE 
claims infringe on its patents. This quality transforms the NPE into a 
PAE. Indeed, some prominent PAEs invest in concealment.210 Only 
then does the PAE threaten its targets with serial litigation and 
catastrophic damages unless they pay exorbitant amounts, typically 
many multiples of the sums that the PAE spent to acquire the asserted 
IPRs. 
This account describes the approach that PAEs often take, but it does 
not explain how a PAE’s threat is credible. How, precisely, can an 
aggregator of weak patents convince an operating company to part with 
tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars? The answer lies in 
subjecting a prospective licensee to a cost far exceeding the ex ante 
competitive baseline royalty. The essential condition for anticompetitive 
aggregation of non-substitute patents is the creation of an unavoidable 
threat. If PAEs credibly threaten prospective licensees with devastating 
costs, regardless of how the targeted firms conduct their business 
processes or from whom else they acquire patent licenses, then patent 
aggregation can facilitate hold-up, even with patents of nugatory 
individual worth.  
This point raises a seeming contradiction. A patentee endangers an 
accused infringer’s product if its patent is valid, infringed, and reads on 
so central a component of the product that the claimed technology is the 
basis for consumer demand. In that situation, a serious threat exists to 
the potential licensee because the legal process will give the IPR owner 
a potentially draconian remedy. Yet if a patent is invalid, pertinent if at 
all only to a peripheral aspect of an accused device, and ultimately not 
infringed, then the law entitles its holder to nothing. How, then, could a 
PAE get something by asserting it? The answer is that its hold-up ability 
emanates from judicial error, litigation costs, and above all obscurity. A 
PAE can achieve this ability by taking advantage of shortcomings in the 
patent system through aggregation, and exacerbating the problem by 
concealing the extent of its patent holdings.  
The threat that the owner of many weak patents can present to a 
potential licensee takes the following forms: (i) an injunction; (ii) a 
catastrophic damages verdict; (iii) large litigation costs; and (iv) a 
combination of (i)–(iii). To inflict the first two forms of injury, a PAE 
must actually win, which is why the owner of a small number of patents 
cannot viably threaten a downstream technology company. But if a 
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company can acquire a practically inexhaustible supply of such IPRs, it 
may impose a substantial hold-up threat. 
Return to the Alpha hypothetical. A PAE only needs to enjoin the 
innovator, Alpha, once for Alpha to lose the entire value of its new 
product design. It is no solace that a PAE may lose on forty patent 
claims before ultimately prevailing on one. If the injunction’s hold-up 
value exceeds the expected litigation costs in securing it, then it will be 
rational for a risk-neutral PAE to persevere in pressing losing patent 
claims until it finally hits big. Moreover, as PAEs are invariably repeat 
players, game theory suggests that it may be rational for them to litigate 
aggressively in the hope of eventually securing a goldmine judgment, 
even if the expected value of doing so with respect to one prospective 
licensee is negative. If that lost income translates into superior hold-up 
ability against other targets—if its investment in building an aggressive 
reputation is sufficiently valuable—a PAE would be justified in losing 
money to make an example of a prominent technology firm that refuses 
to play ball. 
Suppose, then, that a PAE observes the space within which Alpha 
operates and takes note of the latter’s profitability. It sees that Alpha is 
developing a promising, next-generation product line. At that stage, the 
PAE could acquire licensing authority to patents it considers relevant to 
the announced design, approach Alpha to present its proprietary 
technology, and negotiate an appropriate license. Instead of doing so, it 
waits until Alpha has built and is successfully marketing its new good. 
The PAE then springs into action, scouring the marketplace for cheap 
patents that arguably read on some element of Alpha’s new product. It 
keeps its purchasing campaign secret from Alpha until it has acquired a 
critical volume of weak patents. To illustrate, suppose that it amasses 
one-quarter of all Tier C patents. Only then, having built a wall of 
individually shaky but collectively formidable IPRs around the new 
product, does the PAE approach Alpha. Instead of offering a price tied 
to the ex ante competitive benchmark—PC1E + . . . + PC500E—it 
demands far more: say, half the market value of Alpha’s product, V. 
Surveying the quality of the patents that the PAE presents, Alpha 
asks why it should pay so much. The PAE threatens that the alternative 
is a series of lawsuits until it obtains an injunction, at which point it will 
demand V - ε as the price of allowing Alpha to continue marketing its 
good. Alpha realizes that, although it would have a 99% chance of 
prevailing against a single Tier C patent, its odds become less favorable 
as the number of patents-in-suit increases. Against an onslaught of ten 
Tier C patents, Alpha would face an almost 10% chance of being 
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enjoined.211 The expected cost of defending that first wave alone would 
therefore be C + V/10,212 likely vastly larger than the competitive 
benchmark royalties for the respective patents in the portfolio. 
Crunching the numbers, Alpha realizes that it nearly certainly infringes 
at least one valid Tier C patent in the PAE’s portfolio. The targeted 
patent aggregation, even of junk patents bearing an independent 1% 
chance of being valid and infringed, creates a real hold-up threat as 
indicated in the following graph: 
 
 
The preceding conclusion assumed that a court would definitely 
enjoin Alpha if the PAE prevailed on an infringement claim. In the post-
eBay world, it is difficult for PAEs to obtain injunctions, though it is not 
impossible.213 The hold-up threat, however, is not contingent on the 
nuclear remedy of an injunction. That is merely the clearest case, and a 
sufficiently high damages amount—in this hypothetical, any amount 
equal to or exceeding V—carries the same effect. 
If injunctive relief is unavailable, the hold-up threat depends on two 
contingencies: (i) the PAE must succeed on at least one Tier C patent 
claim and (ii) the factfinder must erroneously award damages 
significantly greater than the appropriate ex ante benchmark. How 
likely is it that the second event will materialize with respect to patents 
                                                                                                                     
 211. To be precise, there is a 9.56% chance that Alpha will infringe at least one of the ten 
patents. 
 212. C is the cost of defending the lawsuit, which in the real world would be several 
million dollars. 
 213. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
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as weak as the illustrative Tier C patents here? The answer is very 
likely. 
Under the rules governing reasonable-royalty determinations, 
factfinders must assume that the ex ante probability of validity and 
infringement was 100%.214 Applied to this hypothetical, a jury would 
have to assume that the Tier C patent was definitely valid and infringed 
before the fact, thus overstating the economic value of the IPR one-
hundred fold. That overvaluation enables it, at a minimum, to stake a 
claim to a pecuniary sum from Alpha that exceeds the competitive ex 
ante royalty benchmark. 
That level of damages inflation flows from a substantive flaw in the 
law governing the calculation of reasonable royalties. Juries and judges, 
however, are likely to err in identifying and accounting for the 
economic phenomena surrounding ex ante negotiation, including 
design-around, substitute technologies, the expected market value of the 
envisioned product design, and so on. The prospect of error in the 
damages calculation is particularly acute in this setting because the 
technological complexity of the claimed invention, its role in the 
accused device, and the idiosyncrasies and abstract nature of a 
hypothetical negotiation between warring parties combine to overwhelm 
many judges and juries.215 Not surprisingly, factfinders often exaggerate 
the hypothetically-negotiated reasonable royalty. That is especially 
likely to occur when the infringed patent claims one of the many 
thousands of technologies that an innovator must combine to create a 
marketed product.216 
Some believe that juries and judges are more likely to overestimate 
damages.217 Nevertheless, it is possible that factfinders are as likely to 
understate damages as they are to overestimate them, in which case the 
expected damages award may be the correct one. If that is the case, 
outlier awards will not trouble firms that commercialize technologies 
                                                                                                                     
 214. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 215. See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 
107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998) (discussing the difficulties juries and judges have with the technical 
nature of patent cases and criticizing their unjustified deference to indicia of scientific 
expertise). 
 216. Recently, the Federal Circuit wisely cabined the use of the “entire market value rule,” 
allowing a plaintiff to tie its damages claim to the market value of the accused device only when 
the patented technology is the basis for consumer demand for that product. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318–21 (Fed. Cir. 2011). That court has recognized that 
referring juries to the overall worth of the accused device can bias damages upward. 
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 217. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2144. But see David W. Opderbeck, Patent 
Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 137 (2009) (finding the 
empirical evidence on whether patent awards are systemically excessive to be inconclusive and 
observing that outlier high awards “skew[] the data and the public debate”).  
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downstream. This only holds true if those firms are risk neutral. Faced 
with the prospect of potentially ruinous damages—jury awards on the 
high end reach ten figures,218 and the Federal Circuit has upheld many 
awards in the nine-figure range219—firms are likely to be highly risk 
averse. Conversely, PAEs can diversify risk by litigating several 
infringement suits with uncorrelated risk profiles, and they are more 
likely to be risk neutral. They may, in fact, be risk preferring in 
individual cases, especially high-profile ones, because a large award in 
one would facilitate more effective hold-up of other potential infringers. 
In short, even if the average damages award that judges and juries grant 
over time is “correct,” asymmetric appetite for risk will cause 
downstream technology companies to settle for amounts greater than the 
ex ante benchmark royalty. Because factfinders must assume that the 
likelihood of infringement and validity was 100% ex ante, damages 
awards are inherently biased upward vis-à-vis the appropriate economic 
yardstick. Some measure of ex post hold-up is always available to 
suitably motivated PAEs ex post, even when the constituent patents are 
weak. 
In sum, a PAE in this hypothetical could hold up Alpha by acquiring 
a large number of Tier C patents. Investing in a predatory reputation 
with which to threaten other prospective licensees, the PAE credibly 
threatens to sue Alpha repeatedly with patents that bear just a 1% 
chance of being valid and infringed. No countersuit opportunity exists. 
Knowing that defending each lawsuit will cost several million dollars, 
that the PAE’s litigation costs are lower than its own, and that recurring 
suit carries an initially low but increasingly rising probability of an 
infringement finding and excessive damages award, Alpha will 
rationally pay a large sum to avoid this hold-up threat.  
Ex ante, the Tier C patents would have commanded almost no value 
because of Alpha’s design-around options and the near-guaranteed 
invalidity or noninfringement of those IPRs. This is why the PAE could 
buy them at fire-sale prices. The difference in the PAE’s acquisition 
costs and the amount for which Alpha (and other licensees) settle ex 
post represents the change in market power realized by the strategic 
                                                                                                                     
 218. See, e.g., supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 219. See, e.g., Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1266–67, 1269 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming a $345 million damages award based on infringement of a software 
patent); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming a $240 
million damages award and injunction), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). In another case, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a $185.6 million jury verdict, doubled to $371.2 million, which 
reportedly exceeded the defendant’s 2011 net income. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. 
Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1178, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part and vacated in 
part, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Jonathan Stempel, Court Upholds $371 Million CR Bard 
Patent Award, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/us-crbard-
gore-ruling-idUSTRE8191BH20120210. 
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patent aggregation. Alpha could not have nipped this nascent threat in 
the bud by buying licenses ex ante to the 500 patents that the PAE later 
asserted ex post. Even if the transaction costs of identifying those IPRs 
and negotiating royalties were surmountable, a larger universe of 1500 
Tier C patents remained for the PAE to purchase and assert ex post. 
Alpha cannot avoid this threat except by abandoning its future product 
designs or by acquiring licenses to every conceivable patent in the field 
that might ever conceivably be asserted ex post. For the many reasons 
discussed above, the latter avenue is wholly unrealistic and simply not 
an option. 
c.  Anticompetitive Patent Aggregation of Moderately Weak 
Patents 
The preceding account explained that aggregating even the weakest 
imaginable patents into a sufficiently large portfolio, coupled with the 
credible threat of serial assertion, generates a hold-up threat due to 
judicial proclivity for error and high litigation costs. This Part concludes 
by briefly addressing an intermediate case. What are the potential 
ramifications of collecting IPRs bearing characteristics of Tier B 
patents? 
The effects are similar to those recounted immediately above, save 
that the critical mass of patents needed to mount a viable threat is 
smaller. When each patent bears a 30% chance of being valid and 
infringed, the odds that a portfolio contains at least one such IPR is as 
follows: 
The hold-up threat here is pronounced at a modest acquisition scale. 
To appreciate the welfare effects of aggregating such patents, focus first 
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on the ex ante world in which these IPRs are subject to atomized 
ownership. By assumption, Alpha could design around any asserted Tier 
B patent ex ante, and no such patent yields Alpha a solution that its 
engineers could not readily solve. In that situation, Tier B patents would 
command only a modest value at the product-design phase, made more 
modest still by the fact that a patentee asserting such a patent would 
face a 70% chance of recovering nothing. 
Ex post, however, the design constraint limiting a Tier B patent’s 
value evaporates. In suing ex post, the owner of a single such patent 
should get no more than the modest royalty it could have commanded 
before the fact. Judicial error is rife, however, so Alpha faces a risk that 
the factfinder will fail to credit the design-around alternatives that strip 
Tier B patents of economic value. Alpha also knows that the law 
requires that the factfinder must look past the probable invalidity or 
noninfringement of each such IPR and inflate the damages measure to a 
330% recovery. Furthermore, Alpha knows it will suffer irrecoverable 
litigation costs of millions of dollars in defending a suit. It will therefore 
pay a much larger amount ex post than it would have paid ex ante. It 
cannot avoid such ex post hold-up by acquiring a clearing position ex 
ante due to preclusive transaction costs. 
This leads to a startling conclusion: absent patent aggregation, the 
holder of even one patent bearing a colorable claim of reading on a 
lucrative product can engage in strategic hold-up by (i) refusing to 
approach a known implementer of technology; (ii) waiting for that firm 
to irreversibly invest in a potentially infringing product line; (iii) 
approaching that firm when it is actively selling its new product; and 
(iv) demanding greater than ex ante royalties based on threat of suit. 
Thus, the patentee’s market power naturally evolves by virtue of 
changing market conditions and due to the presence of judicial error and 
high litigation costs. The patentee can realize gain in pricing power 
merely through inaction.220 
A PAE, however, can do much more. The single patentee remains 
subject to real constraints ex post that a PAE can avoid. Those 
limitations on monopoly power include the likelihood of invalidity or 
noninfringement, litigation costs that may make suing a negative value 
proposition, and, potentially, countersuit and reputational constraints. 
Those factors prevent many Tier B-type patentees from suing, which is 
a desirable consequence on account of the hold-up possibility and the 
prevalence of independent invention. By amassing just thirteen Tier B 
patents, however, a PAE can subject Alpha to a greater than 99% 
chance of a finding of infringement. This high probability creates a 
                                                                                                                     
 220. As the next Part explains, such a realization of market power likely falls outside the 
zone of antitrust scrutiny. Competition laws rarely impose affirmative duties but more typically 
prohibit active conduct that inefficiently produces monopoly power. 
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more distinct threat for Alpha than a standalone assertion of one Tier B 
patent, which Alpha has a 70% chance of successfully defeating. Such a 
PAE bypasses the other ex post constraints that limit individual 
assertion for the same reasons discussed above. Therefore, PAEs can 
magnify ex post holdup.221 
This analysis reveals why the oft-touted PAE argument that its 
business model promotes an active patent-licensing market by desirably 
rewarding upstream patentees and boosting innovation is wrong. Ex 
ante aggregation and licensing would carry those benefits, but ex post 
targeted patent accumulation is founded on extracting far greater 
amounts than patent holders could have realized during the product-
design phase. Since the PAE itself acts not as a conduit for transferring 
wealth from downstream innovators to upstream patentees but as a 
bottleneck that captures much of the value for itself, it is unlikely that 
any benefit to patenting incentives outweighs the harm to downstream 
incentives to commercialize technology.222 As the act of patenting 
carries little or no social value absent concomitant marketing or 
informing follow-on innovation, PAE wealth extraction through ex post 
hold-up almost certainly suppresses dynamic efficiency and harms 
consumers.223 
The preceding account is just one of many species of patent 
aggregation, and it is of a particularly odious kind. The question that 
this Article explores, however, is whether there may be an antitrust case 
against extreme versions of hold-up founded on patent accumulation. 
The next Part explains that such a case indeed exists. Although there are 
challenges to establishing a Sherman Act violation based on targeted 
acquisitions of complementary IPRs, those difficulties stem from the 
novel context in which possible antitrust claims arise. The principles 
governing whether a cause of action may exist, however, are quite 
traditional. 
III.  TARGETED PATENT AGGREGATION AS MONOPOLIZATION 
This Part explores how PAEs might fit into the antitrust model in a 
way that would permit control of their conduct and its costs. It explores 
concepts of harm, relevant market, monopoly power and exclusionary 
conduct to make the case that such control is appropriate. 
                                                                                                                     
 221. In the real world, patents vary in quality from definitely valid and infringed to junk, 
rather than three distinct probability groups. The essential insights discussed through this Part, 
however, remain true. 
 222. Richard Posner, Patent Trolls, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (July 21, 2013, 5:12 PM) 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/patent-trollsposner.html (“It is extremely difficult 
to discern any possible social benefit from trolls, and extremely easy to discern substantial 
social costs.”). 
 223. See id.  
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A.  An Introduction to the Practice 
PAEs can manipulate shortcomings in the patent system to acquire 
greater pricing power than would exist in either an atomized world or 
one in which licensing takes place ex ante.224 The net effects of PAE 
hold-up are almost certainly negative.225 Patentee returns exceeding the 
incremental value of the claimed technology vis-à-vis its closest 
substitute technology and/or non-infringing design alternative result in 
overcompensation and an incentive to engage in too much patent-
eligible inventing.226 Simultaneously, the overcharge extracted from 
downstream technology firms comes at the cost of the more important 
incentive to develop and commercialize cutting-edge technologies. It 
also causes prices to rise and output to drop in the downstream 
market.227 Thus, there is sound reason to believe that at least some PAE 
conduct degrades welfare and efficiency.  
A distinct question, though, is whether competition law has anything 
to say about PAE activity. Patent aggregation and ex post assertion by 
NPEs may be a public policy problem, but is it an antitrust problem? 
This Part concludes that, although antitrust rules are no panacea for 
strategic behavior in the patent space and their application in this setting 
requires treading new ground, they may be capable of addressing the 
most egregious forms of PAE hold-up. Specifically, if a PAE targets a 
lucrative product line, amasses and conceals individually weak patents 
until the firm has brought the targeted goods to market, and then 
threatens and files successive, predominantly losing lawsuits to extract 
royalties disproportionate to the prices at which the PAE bought those 
patents, a cause of action under the antitrust laws may exist.  
A predicate for the antitrust suit is that the asset transfers giving rise 
to the PAE’s ownership did not simply transfer a fixed amount of 
market power. Rather, the accumulation of patents must increase market 
power. In that respect, the case for antitrust condemnation for building a 
patent portfolio through IPR acquisitions is inversely related to the 
strength of the patents in the portfolio. As Part II explained, collecting 
and enforcing almost-certainly-valid and infringing patents creates little 
new market power—such actions simply transfer a monopoly from one 
entity to another. While a PAE could use such IPRs to hold up 
downstream innovators, the greater than ex ante royalties available flow 
from flaws in the patent system and could be equally taken advantage of 
by the original patentee or an assignee. By contrast, when a PAE 
                                                                                                                     
 224. See supra Part II. 
 225. See supra Subsection II.A.3.c. 
 226. See generally Nicholas P. Chan, Comment, Balancing Judicial Misvaluation and 
Patent Hold-Up: Some Principles for Considering Injunctive Relief After eBay, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 746, 763–69 (2012) (explaining the dangers of patentee overcompensation). 
 227. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.  
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strategically collects predominantly weak patents to create a hold-up 
threat, it seizes otherwise nonexistent monopoly power.228 It would 
seem that at least some aggregation in the PAE space is of the latter 
variety.229 Strong public policy grounds exist for limiting PAE 
accumulation and assertion of weak IPRs.230 But can antitrust perform 
this limiting function?  
Some practices would raise concerns under traditional antitrust 
principles and are not the focus of this Article. For instance, if two 
competitors in a downstream product market conspire to raise their 
mutual rivals’ costs by assigning their patents to a PAE that can sue on 
their behalf without fear of countersuit, it would likely violate Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.231 Separately, in a traditional technology-licensing 
market comprised of substitute patents that perform the same function, 
albeit in distinct and nonoverlapping ways, a PAE that acquired all of 
those patents would eliminate competition and monopolize that market 
under Section 2, absent countervailing efficiency gains.232 Additionally, 
some courts have held that the holder of a standard-essential patent 
(SEP) can monopolize a technology-licensing market by reneging on or 
strategically avoiding a commitment to license on FRAND (fair, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory) terms, thus inducing a standard-
setting organization (SSO) to adopt its proprietary technology.233 
Should an SSO member/SEP-holder strategically conceal its patent in 
concert with a PAE, assigning that SEP to the PAE to hold up 
                                                                                                                     
 228. See Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 470 (“Mass aggregation of related but 
weak patents may thus allow the PAE to achieve a rather novel type of scale economy.”). 
 229. See, e.g., William Thomashower, Means to Control the Patent Trolls, COMPUTER & 
INTERNET LAW., Dec. 2013, at 1, 2 (quoting Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte during the “Abusive 
Patent Litigation” hearing who said that “PAEs . . . often times acquire weak or poorly-granted 
patents”); Jay Levine, FTC Study on “Patent Troll” Behavior: Innovation Enhancers or Competition 
Killers? Part 2, TECH. LAW SOURCE (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.technologylawsource.com/2013/10/ar 
ticles/intellectual-property-1/ftc-study-on-patent-troll-behavior-innovation-enhancers-or-competition-kill 
ers-part-2/ (discussing the use of weak patents). 
 230. See, e.g., Erik N. Hovenkamp, Predatory Patent Litigation: How Patent Assertion 
Entities Use Reputation to Monetize Bad Patents (Aug. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2308115 (discussing the 
manner in which predatory patent litigation by PAEs hinders innovation and promotes 
questionable patenting). 
 231. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013) (citing United 
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963)) (discussing how a conspiracy to exclude a 
mutual competitor can violate the Sherman Act); see also IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 
116, at 25 ex. 9. 
 232. See, e.g., IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 116, at 8 & ex. 2. 
 233. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007); see also 
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *4–8 (N.D. Cal. 
May 14, 2012); cf. Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456, 468–69 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(noting the antitrust concerns present where patent disclosure policies require competitors to 
disclose trade secrets). 
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implementers of a standard after the fact, the PAE’s actions could 
violate Sections 1–2 of the Sherman Act if the other elements of those 
causes of action were satisfied.234 
This Article instead considers whether mass-scale aggregation of 
non-substitute but related patents can violate the antitrust laws within 
existing precedent.235 It begins by analyzing whether Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act condemns such accumulation. It concludes by considering 
whether a PAE’s patent aggregation involves asset acquisitions that tend 
to create a monopoly or substantially limit competition in contravention 
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Additionally, this Article explains how 
a victim of PAE hold-up might best articulate these theories and 
addresses the major challenges to prevailing on these claims. 
B.  Aggregating Complementary IPRs as a Section 2 Violation 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act has multiple provisions, including 
conspiracy and attempt, which may be relevant to firms that challenge 
various forms of PAE conduct. This Article focuses, however, on actual 
monopolization. A firm violates Section 2 in that manner when it 
willfully acquires monopoly power other than by means “of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”236 To show that PAE 
patent accumulation violates this provision, a company would have to 
prove that (i) a relevant market exists; (ii) the PAE possesses monopoly 
power in that market; and (iii) the PAE willfully acquired that power 
through anticompetitive, exclusionary, or otherwise improper means.237  
                                                                                                                     
 234. Courts have not yet addressed this question. 
 235. Until September 2014, only one case had analyzed whether a PAE’s aggregation of 
patents violated antitrust law, and it had answered that question negatively. See Intellectual 
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00740, 2013 WL 6682981, at *1, *8 
(E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013). This author appeared on behalf of Capital One in that case. This 
Article does not address that decision but instead focuses on analyzing the antitrust issues 
implicated by PAE patent accumulation from the perspective of precedential law. As noted 
below, however, two federal courts have since ordered discovery on monopolization allegations 
against a PAE for patent aggregation and concealment. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital 
One Fin. Corp., No. 14-cv-00111-PWG, 2015 WL 898146, at *6–16 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2015); 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., No. 13-440-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
134255, at *13–14 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2014). Some respected commentators suggest that the 
Eastern District of Virginia may have erred in dismissing Capital One’s antitrust claims. See 
Michelle D. Miller & Janusz A. Ordover, Intellectual Ventures v. Capital One: Can Antitrust 
Law and Economics Get Us Past the Trolls?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 29 2015, at 6, 
available at https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/
Documents/intellectual-ventures-v-capital-one.pdf. 
 236. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); see also United States 
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting that a firm can lawfully 
acquire monopoly power through “superior skill, foresight and industry”). 
 237. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71; Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession 
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Importantly, an antitrust plaintiff would have to overcome three 
obstacles. Those challenges, however, are surmountable. Indeed, as this 
Article was going to print, two federal district courts recognized that a 
PAE may monopolize a technology market in aggregating and 
concealing patents to achieve monopoly power.238 The first obstacle is 
that a plaintiff would have to show that it is anticompetitive to amass 
patents that are related by virtue of being arguably relevant to a 
particular product line or industry. Since the owners of such IPRs do not 
necessarily compete with one another in the conventional sense, a PAE 
could argue that its acquisitions do not eliminate any competition and 
thus cannot be exclusionary as a matter of law. Second, a plaintiff 
would have to show that any monopoly power enjoyed by a PAE is not 
inherent in the patent grant. Because a valid patent grants its owner a 
lawful right to exclude,239 a plaintiff may have to demonstrate that a 
PAE’s market power exceeds the total power of the individual IPRs in 
the challenged portfolio. Third, a party challenging a PAE’s lawsuit 
under Section 2 may have to overcome the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, 
which immunizes certain conduct—even anticompetitive conduct—
founded on petitioning the government.240 This Article shows that these 
challenges do not foreclose plausible antitrust claims. 
1.  A PAE’s Patent Portfolio as the Relevant Market 
In traditional cases challenging IPR accumulation, the plaintiffs 
compete in a product market with the patent aggregator.241 They 
typically allege that the aggregator has a dominant position and is 
acquiring so many patents that it will monopolize the downstream 
market.242 In such a setting, the relevant market is a conventional 
product market comprised of those goods that are reasonably 
                                                                                                                     
of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 238. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 14-cv-00111-PWG, 
2015 WL 898146, at *6–16 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2015) (Intellectual Ventures, a PAE, plausibly 
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act in aggregating and 
concealing 3,500 financial-services patents); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 
No. 13-440-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134255, at *13–14 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2014) (finding 
that allegations of targeted patent aggregation sufficiently stated an affirmative defense of patent 
misuse founded on monopolization). Generally, courts may have overemphasized the 
importance of patent protection to antitrust analysis—a trend that the Supreme Court in Actavis 
may have reversed. See generally Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and 
Structuring the Rule of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 61 (2014) (discussing the concept of “patent exceptionalism and explain[ing] how the 
Supreme Court decision in Actavis moves away from it”). 
 239. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
 240. Infra Subsection III.B.4.  
 241. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 242. See, e.g., id. at 267–68. 
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interchangeable in consumers’ eyes.243 The courts then scrutinize the 
impugned patent acquisitions’ downstream effects on price and 
output.244 
That approach is wrong with respect to PAEs, which by definition do 
not compete in downstream product markets. Indeed, “a firm cannot 
monopolize a market in which it does not compete.”245 The role of 
market definition is to focus analysis on the economic milieu in which a 
challenged restraint takes place. Because PAEs operate exclusively in 
upstream technology markets, the focus must lie upstream. 
However, market definition may not be a fruitful line of inquiry in 
the ex post technology-licensing space. When lock-in has occurred, 
previously available substitutes become unavailable, meaning that the 
only remaining market is one of unlicensed technology.246 No 
competition takes place; therefore, inferences from any market share 
have limited meaning. Traditional market definition identifies the 
universe of substitutes, thus allowing the factfinder to measure the 
defendant’s share of that space and infer the firm’s market power. In the 
ex post space, however, market share is not always as meaningful. To 
see the conceptual difficulties of market definition in this space, 
suppose that a product implicated 10,000 discrete proprietary 
technologies and 100 of them were minimally adequate to create a hold-
up threat sufficient to extract greater than ex ante royalties. In an 
atomized world, no one patent would occupy its own market, but an 
aggregator might create an ex post market by acquiring 1000 of those 
IPRs. Yet, it would possess only 10% of the relevant patents reading on 
the accused device—far less than the market share typically required for 
proof of monopolization. Worse still, the accumulator could divide its 
portfolio by ten, keeping one share for itself and selling the others to 
nine different companies. Consequently, ten markets would exist where 
previously there was one.  
Although market definition is the traditional starting point for 
monopolization analysis under Section 2, it may not be the best starting 
point in this setting. Instead, the proper focus might be on whether 
monopoly power exists, and, if so, whether that power exceeds the 
combined powers of the constituent patents in the portfolio. Some 
courts have recognized that one can forego market definition when 
                                                                                                                     
 243. See, e.g., id. at 269.  
 244. See id. at 272.  
 245. See, e.g., Discon, Inc. v. Nynex Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1996), vacated, 
525 U.S. 128 (1998).  
 246. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 
(Posner, J., by designation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and vacated in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014). 
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direct evidence of monopoly power is available.247 That would be the 
ideal manner in which to approach the antitrust implication of PAE 
patent aggregation. Nevertheless, the predominant view is that a 
plaintiff must at least identify the contours of the relevant market that 
the defendant allegedly monopolized.248 Thus, some exploration of the 
relevant market will likely be necessary. The question, then, is what the 
relevant market is for PAE conduct of the kind scrutinized in Part II. 
One approach is to define each discrete licensing market comprised 
of substitute technologies. Referring back to Part II’s hypothetical, this 
approach would identify 4000 different markets. Nine hundred of them 
would be competitive with two interchangeable patents claiming 
equivalent but different methods of performing a particular function. 
For the remaining 3100 markets, each of the 3100 patentees would have 
100% market share in its own market, though ex ante only the 100 Tier 
A patentees would have monopoly power due to Alpha’s design-around 
options. Construed in this way, many relevant markets exist in which to 
analyze a PAE’s targeted patent aggregation. To undertake the requisite 
antitrust analysis, a court would have to focus on the competitive effects 
within each market, ignoring externalities. This approach would suggest 
that anticompetitive consequences could ensue only with respect to the 
900 technology markets subject to competitive choice because the 
remaining 3100 markets are and remain monopolized.  
This methodology fails to encapsulate the full universe of 
competitive effects relevant to the analysis. It incorrectly suggests that 
each individual patent-licensing market comprised of substitute 
technologies is economically independent of other markets, when in 
reality those markets are closely interconnected and affect each other in 
ways that matter to the market effects of patentee behavior. For 
instance, combining many weak, non-substitute patents can dramatically 
increase the price of all of them. One can only account for this effect by 
adopting a broader market definition. Thus, it cannot be a correct 
market definition for analyzing PAE patent aggregation. An appropriate 
methodology must reflect the fact that the PAE targets downstream 
innovators’ products and that the aggregated patents, though not 
substitutes, are related in their potential application to those products. 
The best approach—or perhaps the least imperfect one—is to define 
the relevant market as the portfolio that the PAE has constructed 
through its patent-acquisition campaign.249 This definition reflects the 
                                                                                                                     
 247. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“[D]irect proof of monopoly power does not require a definition of the relevant market.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993); Republic 
Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 737 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 249. Illustratively, in 1979, the Supreme Court observed that a blanket license to a 
copyright aggregator’s portfolio “is, to some extent, a different product” than licenses to “the 
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Supreme Court’s instruction that consumer choice and commercial 
realities dictate the contours of the relevant market.250 When a PAE 
builds an inescapable portfolio to hold up a given downstream firm, that 
firm has no choice in licensing. No one other than the PAE can offer a 
license to its portfolio. No one else can sell protection against the PAE’s 
hold-up threat. These features suggest that there may be a relevant 
market limited to the PAE’s portfolio.251 
This market definition is imperfect because it is not stable over time. 
It originates only as a result of the PAE’s acquisitions. This 
characteristic may strike some economists as odd; nevertheless, it 
reflects the reality in the marketplace. Intellectual Ventures, for 
instance, claims that it has “create[d] a new market from scratch.”252 A 
second oddity is that the relevant market is capable of giving birth to 
two or more separate markets if it is large enough to be subdivided into 
distinct portfolios, each capable of holding up downstream firms. 
Again, that feature reflects the reality of the economic phenomena 
studied in this Article.  
2.  Monopoly Power 
To trigger scrutiny under Section 2, a PAE must either have 
monopoly power or a dangerous probability of acquiring monopoly 
power.253 One can prove monopoly power either directly by evidence 
that the defendant controls output or prices, or indirectly by drawing 
inferences based on the firm’s possession of a certain share of the 
market and the presence of entry barriers and other supply-side 
constraints on market power.254 Importantly, it is both a legal and 
                                                                                                                     
individual compositions.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21–22 
(1979). A very similar principle applies here. 
 250. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481–82 (1992) 
(“The relevant market for antitrust purposes is determined by the choices available to 
[consumers]. . . . The proper market definition in this case can be determined only after a factual 
inquiry into the ‘commercial realities’ faced by consumers.”). 
 251. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 9177, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24517, at *28, *31 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2011) (holding that, although a performing-rights 
organization, SESAC accounted for a relatively small percentage of all copyrighted music, 
“plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that, because of the existence of SESAC songs in critical 
shows and commercials (as well the alleged difficulty in determining the full contents of the 
SESAC repertory), they cannot avoid music in the SESAC repertory,” so the repertory 
constituted its own market); see also Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 315. 
 252. Invention Marketplace, INTELL. VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/
about/invention-marketplace (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
 253. Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456; see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 
563, 570–71 (1966). 
 254. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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economic mistake to infer monopoly power from the ownership of IPRs 
alone.255 
Beginning with the inferential approach, one might observe that a 
PAE that has amassed a sufficiently large portfolio to create a hold-up 
threat accounts for all sales of licenses to IPRs in its portfolio. From that 
perspective, it would possess 100% of the market.256 Even a firm with 
100% market share can lack monopoly power if entry barriers are 
absent.257 In this setting, however, the PAE exercises unfettered control 
over the licensing of the patents in its portfolio. Even if a determined 
entrant were to purchase a subset of the PAE’s patents, a large universe 
of unenforced IPRs remains available for the PAE to acquire to bolster 
its portfolio.258 Ultimately, if a PAE has constructed an offensive patent 
portfolio to hold up downstream targets, the only limitation on the 
PAE’s monopoly power is the cost that it can credibly threaten to inflict 
on the target through repeated litigation. 
Therefore, if a PAE aggregates weak patents to eliminate choice and 
thus impose an inescapable threat on downstream innovators, direct 
evidence of monopoly power should exist. Discovery into the sum of 
the prices that the aggregator paid for the IPRs in its portfolio, the terms 
on which prior licensing, if any, by the assignor took place, and internal 
projections and cost-benefit assessments of acquired patents would shed 
light on the power that the aggregation realized. Differences between 
the net price that a PAE paid for its IPRs and the price at which the PAE 
sells those rights—if substantial—would indicate acquisition of 
otherwise absent monopoly power, and scale efficiencies in litigation 
alone would not plausibly explain them. 
3.  Exclusionary Conduct 
Once a firm possesses monopoly power in a relevant market, the 
remaining question is whether the defendant willfully acquired that 
                                                                                                                     
 255. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43 n.4 (2006). 
 256. Some courts have concluded that possessing nearly 100% of the market is strong 
evidence of monopoly power. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
452 (1992) (concluding that controlling 80% to 95% market share is sufficient evidence of 
monopoly power to survive summary judgment); Meredith Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24517, at *48 (“Here, where SESAC holds nearly 100% of the relevant market, it is clear that 
they have established monopoly power.”). 
 257. See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 258. One might argue that the right market definition should account for the larger universe 
of IPRs available to the PAE to bolster its portfolio. Nevertheless, one can fruitfully analyze this 
consideration outside the confines of market definition, as the law typically does with respect to 
supply-side substitution (entry), which is a critical determinant of monopoly power not usually 
considered in defining the market. See Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 
227 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the measure of a market’s geographic scope).  
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position.259 This last step does not inexorably follow from the existence 
of dominance, and the Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he mere 
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of 
the free-market system.”260 The question is whether the firm achieved 
its dominant position in a procompetitive manner, thus promoting the 
goals that the Court has identified as justifying supracompetitive 
pricing. Specifically, “[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at 
least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first 
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth.”261 Thus, dominance acquired pursuant to innovation or 
efficiency is not only lawful; it is laudable.262 Conversely, when a firm 
acquires such power through anticompetitive conduct—not through “a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”263—
condemnation properly follows. 
a.  Analyzing PAE Aggregation and Hold-Up Under the Rule of 
Reason 
Section 2 usually involves a rule-of-reason-type analysis where a 
plaintiff must first demonstrate that the accused firm’s conduct carries 
anticompetitive effect, thus harming consumers and not merely injuring 
competitors.264 If the complainant thus establishes a prima facie case, 
then “the monopolist [must] assert[] a procompetitive justification—a 
nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on 
the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or 
enhanced consumer appeal.”265 In that event, the burden shifts back to 
the plaintiff to establish that the conduct’s net effect is 
anticompetitive.266 In weighing procompetitive and anticompetitive 
effects, courts focus “upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent 
behind it.”267 
                                                                                                                     
 259. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 260. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). 
 261. Id. 
 262. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(observing that because “a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by § 2 to compete 
aggressively on the merits, any success that it may achieve through ‘the process of invention and 
innovation’ is clearly tolerated” (quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. 
Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953)). 
 263. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71. 
 264. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 265. Id. at 59. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. That law does not make intent irrelevant, of course, to a Section 2 claim. See, e.g., 
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953). 
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In targeting existing lucrative products, not practicing any 
technology, and amassing weak patents to the point that its portfolio 
poses an outsize threat, a PAE can acquire market power exceeding the 
total power of the constituent patents when disaggregated. This 
monopoly-power-producing conduct is intentional and involves neither 
business acumen nor a superior product. The conduct at issue is a 
classic form of strategic hold-up.268 It inflates IPR royalties above their 
appropriate ex ante benchmark levels, causing upstream patentee 
overcompensation, excessive taxation of independent downstream 
innovation, and increased prices, while reducing output in downstream 
product markets. These are classic anticompetitive effects.269 Subject to 
complications discussed below, these effects, if demonstrated through a 
developed record, should establish a prima facie case under Section 2. 
A PAE would almost certainly proffer a procompetitive justification 
of facilitating a more liquid market for the monetization of IPRs, thus 
rewarding patentees and diminishing free-riding. This defense should 
not be immediately dismissed. As noted above, patent aggregation is not 
devoid of merit and, in some circumstances, can enhance welfare. In 
achieving litigation-scale economies, a PAE can provide a return for 
some upstream patentees for whom the cost of assertion, rather than the 
weaknesses of their IPRs, caused suboptimal rates of assertion.  
This justification, however, will not suffice when a PAE combines 
weak patents ex post to achieve otherwise absent monopoly power. 
When the patent accumulation does not result in the dispersal of 
licenses to strong patents that are valid and infringed, and which are 
hence essential inputs in the downstream commercialization process, 
but instead creates a hold-up threat using patents that would not and 
should not have been asserted on account of their low quality, the 
welfare losses triggered by PAE aggregation and assertion swamp any 
countervailing benefits. 
This conclusion follows for at least three reasons. First, PAEs do not 
engage in a zero-sum transfer. Every dollar lost by a downstream 
technology company to a PAE is not a dollar gained by an upstream 
patentee. The PAE acts as a monopolistic gateway, securing the 
majority of the wealth it extracts for its own purposes and sharing 
merely a fraction with upstream patentees. Money fueling hold-up 
rather than rewarding inventors of novel, useful, and nonobvious 
inventions will not promote social welfare. Even if upstream incentives 
                                                                                                                     
 268. Courts have held that certain forms of hold-up in the patent setting resulting in 
monopoly power in a technology-licensing market constitute actionable anticompetitive 
behavior. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 315 (3d Cir. 2007); see 
also Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *4–8 (N.D. Cal. 
May 14, 2012). 
 269. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). 
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to obtain patents were as important as downstream incentives to 
innovate, PAE royalty extractions reduce the latter more than they 
promote the former.  
Second, from the perspective of social welfare, what matters most is 
not a notional technology disclosed in a document but the realization of 
that technology in a consumable form. A major problem with PAE 
activity is that, to the extent it generates licensing revenue that flows 
into the hands of upstream patentees, it magnifies incentives to patent 
but not to commercialize. Developing a technology from the conceptual 
stage to realization is often investment-heavy and risky. To promote 
social welfare, the right incentive is one to develop and market 
technology. PAE conduct suppresses that incentive.  
Third, even if a PAE’s behavior carried some procompetitive 
benefit, the harms that it inflicts on innovation incentives are greater 
than those necessary to achieve that benefit. Particularly, PAEs could 
provide licensing convenience without undermining price competition 
by acquiring nonexclusive licenses rather than assignments from 
upstream patentees. Doing so would allow downstream innovators 
confronted with excessive prices to negotiate potentially lower prices 
with the upstream patentees, thus limiting the patent aggregator’s 
monopoly power. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has weighed in on 
this scenario. In 1979, the Court held that two copyright aggregators, 
ASCAP and BMI, did not commit a per se antitrust violation in 
amassing and licensing thousands of copyrighted musical works 
because consent decrees entered into with the Justice Department 
ensured that licensees enjoyed “a real choice.”270 Specifically, they 
could negotiate direct licenses from the aggregators’ affiliates.271 PAE 
aggregation, by contrast, entails no such right. By acquiring outright 
ownership and exclusive licensing authority over a large patent portfolio 
targeting a lucrative firm’s business or product, PAEs suffocate the 
escape-valve of direct licensing that the Supreme Court emphasized 
“must not be ignored” when analyzing antitrust principles.272 
These combined effects suggest that a PAE that achieves monopoly 
power by aggregating weak patents and licensing them under threat of 
recurring suit causes net anticompetitive effects. 
b.  Can Patent Aggregation Constitute Exclusionary Conduct? 
A threshold issue is whether patent accumulation can constitute 
anticompetitive behavior under Section 2. The little law that exists on 
this question pours cold water on bold claims that IPR accumulation 
                                                                                                                     
 270. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10–11, 24 (1979). 
 271. See id. at 11, 24. 
 272. See, e.g., id. at 24. 
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naturally lends itself to monopolization. The Supreme Court declared in 
1950 that the “mere accumulation of patents, no matter how many, is 
not in and of itself illegal.”273 
Generally, patent aggregation is desirable in many scenarios; 
therefore, an overarching prohibition would be mistaken.274 Automatic 
Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. merely holds that 
IPR accumulation is not per se illegal. In any event, the theory of harm 
pertaining to PAE aggregation articulated in this Article does not simply 
rely on the sheer number of patents involved. The relationship among 
the patents infuses the accumulation with anticompetitive effect. 
Targeting a product comprised of thousands of discrete technological 
components and then amassing weak patents arguably reading on 
distinct elements of that good creates monopoly power in much the 
same way as—and, in some circumstances, even more effectively 
than—eliminating available substitutes reading on one component. 
Indeed, the ex post character of the challenged acquisition and assertion 
is a key element of PAE’s anticompetitive hold-up.275 
IPR aggregation can be unlawful. “Patent acquisitions are not 
immune from the antitrust laws.”276 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit observed that “a patent holder may run afoul of the 
antitrust laws” by “expand[ing] [its] monopoly by misuse, agreement, or 
accumulation.”277 Perhaps most intriguingly, in its “no matter how 
many” pronouncement, the Supreme Court highlighted that the record 
before it did not support “charges that respondent uses its accumulation 
of patents ‘for the exaction of tribute’ and collects royalties ‘by means 
                                                                                                                     
 273. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950), 
overruled on other grounds by Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 89 S. Ct. 1902 (1969) (overuling 
Hazeltine’s rule regarding the estoppel doctrine). 
 274. See supra Subsection II.A.3.b. 
 275. Cf. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981) (supposing that a 
dominant firm’s acquisition of a patent targeting a competitor’s existing products would 
“[s]urely” violate § 2 because “in such a case the patented invention already has been 
commercialized successfully, and the magnitude of the transgression of the antitrust laws’ 
proscription against willful aggregations of market power outweighs substantially the negative 
effect that the elimination of that class of purchasers for commercialized patents places upon the 
patent system”). 
 276. Id.; see also 3 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 704b, at 160 (2d ed. 2002) 
(“[W]hether accomplished by internal development or by acquisition, one firm’s aggregation of 
numerous patents, even less significant ones, can impair actual and potential competition.”). 
 277. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981); see 
also In re Xerox Corp., No. 8909, 1975 WL 173245 ¶ 14(c), at *3 (F.T.C. July 29, 1975) 
(finding Xerox’s patent aggregation harmful to competition and specifically objecting to its 
“developing and maintaining a patent structure of great size, complexity, and obscurity of 
boundaries”), modified, 1982 WL 608326 (F.T.C. Sept. 10, 1982). 
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of the overpowering threat of disastrous litigation.’”278 One wonders 
what the Court would make of mass-scale aggregation of the kind 
analyzed here if it had occasion to scrutinize a developed record of the 
practice. The Court’s phraseology seems tailored to describe the PAE 
business model. 
Circuit-level precedent on point is lacking because even though the 
PAE phenomenon is not itself new,279 its current scale and harm to the 
U.S. economy certainly are. Nevertheless, three fruitful avenues exist to 
explore whether PAE patent aggregation might amount to actionable 
anticompetitive conduct in violation of Section 2.  
First, the Supreme Court’s leading pronouncement on the law of 
monopolization holds that the “willful acquisition” of monopoly power 
is illegal except in three cases where the events responsible for 
generating that power are either independently salutary or not the doing 
of the monopolist.280 Therefore, it is not clear that only monopoly power 
acquired through the elimination of substitutes is actionable.281 To the 
contrary, it is incumbent on a firm strategically securing otherwise 
nonexistent monopoly power that harms consumers to show that its 
behavior carries procompetitive justifications.282 For reasons explored 
in Part II, a PAE achieving hold-up power by aggregating weak patents 
could not make such a showing.  
Expanding on this point, it makes little sense to speak of eliminating 
“competition” in the ex post world where PAEs operate. Irreversible 
investment in a product line obviates substitute technologies that were 
once viable alternatives to the technical solutions that the innovator 
ultimately chose to adopt. By waiting until lock-in occurs, a PAE 
ensures that sunk capital expenditures remove prior competitive 
constraints. In the ex post world, competition consists of IPR holders 
striving for the greatest possible share of the profit stream generated by 
the infringing device. Like competition to obtain a monopoly, this can 
be socially inefficient, specifically when it results in hold-up payments 
                                                                                                                     
 278. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. at 834. 
 279. Some say that the first patent troll was George B. Selden, who engaged in submarine 
patenting by sitting on his patent application for sixteen years until he thought the patent was most 
valuable, at which point he patented the automobile concept and later sold the patent to a financer who 
sued the Ford Motor Company. See Richard Snow, The Father of All Patent Trolls, FORBES 
(July 30, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2013/07/30/the-father-of-
all-patent-trolls/. However, the Ford Motor Company eventually prevailed. Id. 
 280. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (finding “a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident” to be justifications for attainment or preservation 
of market dominance). 
 281. See generally Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule 
of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435 
(2006) (espousing the view that monopolization standards should and do flex in light of the 
distinct nature of the conduct challenged in a particular case). 
 282. See supra notes 264–65. 
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exceeding the ex ante benchmark. PAEs compound this inefficiency. 
They seize monopoly power not by eliminating substitutes but by 
magnifying hold-up founded on lock-in. PAEs’ strategic patent 
aggregation seeks to remove constraints on monopoly power that exist 
ex post, thus generating otherwise absent monopoly power. Such 
monopolization has powerful anticompetitive effects. PAEs are not the 
rare species of business that operates in an antitrust-free zone with 
freedom to acquire monopoly power and inflict serious losses on 
consumers without limitation.  
Second, exploring the few circuit decisions addressing patent 
acquisitions by operating companies can explain whether acquiring and 
asserting IPRs can itself be anticompetitive. If the effects of amassing 
patents dictate the outcome, then there is no categorical rule that IPR 
aggregation is always or never anticompetitive. Consequently, one can 
legitimately tie a PAE’s patent accumulation to the monopoly power 
that follows and condemn it on that basis. In other words, if IPR 
aggregation is just a form of commercial conduct like many others—
often benign, sometimes beneficial, and occasionally anticompetitive—
then all that remains in scrutinizing PAE aggregation under Section 2 is 
to judge the conduct by its effects alone. Again, any such analysis is 
most unlikely to be favorable to a PAE engaging in ex post hold-up 
using weak patents. 
Some famous cases illuminate this discussion. In Kobe, Inc. v. 
Dempsey Pump Co.,283 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
addressed a situation in which a firm targeted a market for hydraulic 
pumps used in deep oil wells.284 The firm acquired as many patents 
reading on those pumps as it could, licensed them on the condition that 
the licensees not compete with it, brought infringement actions, and 
publicized its enforcement campaign.285 The Tenth Circuit affirmed a 
Section 2 violation, holding that the aggregation and assertion of 
patents, some of which were valid and infringed, constituted actionable 
exclusionary conduct.286  
Kobe’s context was distinct from that explored in this Article. PAEs 
do not compete in downstream product markets; thus, they do not direct 
their infringement actions against horizontal competitors. But that is an 
inconsequential distinction. An antitrust objection to PAE conduct goes 
not to a downstream product market but to an upstream technology-
licensing market. The sole question presently of interest is whether 
patent aggregation and assertion may be exclusionary behavior under 
                                                                                                                     
 283. 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).  
 284. Id. at 418. 
 285. See id. at 419–22.  
 286. See id. at 418, 425, 427, 430. 
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Section 2. Kobe says yes.287 The Chief Judge of the District of Delaware 
found likewise in 2014, holding that Intellectual Ventures’ alleged 
aggregation and concealment of patents required discovery to determine 
whether they constituted patent misuse due to monopolization.288 
In United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.,289 the Supreme Court 
condemned manufacturers of household zigzag sewing machines for 
assigning their patents to the conspirator in the best position to enforce 
the patents against their mutual rivals.290 The Court noted that it would 
be one thing for a firm to acquire patents to protect its own product, but 
another thing altogether to do so for the benefit of its coconspirators.291 
Observing that “[b]y aggregating patents in one control, the holder of 
the patents cannot escape the prohibitions of the Sherman Act,” the 
Supreme Court held that the agreed acquisition and enforcement of 
patents violated Section 1.292 
Again, the facts in Singer are distinct from those surrounding PAE 
hold-up, which does not generally involve horizontal rivals in a product 
market conspiring to exclude their mutual competitors. That is merely to 
say that Singer was a Section 1 case, while the strategic patent 
aggregation considered here attracts Section 2. The question is not 
whether Singer is on all fours with the practices under scrutiny here but 
whether the decision sheds light on whether patent aggregation that 
does not eliminate competition between substitute patents may 
nevertheless be exclusionary for the purposes of Section 2. Singer 
answers this question in the affirmative. Importantly, the 
anticompetitive effect was not that the arrangement eliminated 
substitute-licensing opportunities for the nonconspiring sewing machine 
producers. Rather, it was that the agreement increased the likelihood 
and scale of IPR enforcement. Singer was better able to assert IPRs than 
its foreign coconspirators so the patent threat faced by the 
nonconspirators was greater when the patents were combined under its 
control rather than dissipated among many patentees whose 
enforcement efforts would be less effective.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 287. Id.; see also In re Great Lakes Chem. Corp., No. 9155, 1984 WL 565323 ¶ 29(a)–(f), 
at *4 (F.T.C. May 23, 1984) (concluding that “[t]he effect of [a] proposed acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly” in the relevant market). 
 288. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., No. 13-440-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 134255, at *13–14 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2014) (discussing Kobe, 198 F.2d 416). 
 289. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).  
 290. Id. at 193–95. 
 291. Id. at 194. 
 292. Id. at 197 (quoting United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948)). 
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c.  Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. 
Ultimately, the most important decision governing whether and how 
to subject PAE aggregation to scrutiny under the antitrust laws is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, 
Inc.293 Actavis fundamentally altered U.S. law governing the 
relationship between patents and antitrust. At first blush, the subject 
matter of that opinion seems esoteric, concerning pay-for-delay 
arrangements in which a patent-owning pharmaceutical company pays a 
generic-drug producer seeking to enter its market to stay out and not 
challenge the patent.294 That may appear to be leagues apart from 
strategic patent aggregation by PAEs. Upon closer examination, 
however, the parallels are close, and the Court’s espoused principles in 
Actavis suggest the answer in the PAE setting as well. 
Actavis held that reverse exclusionary payments are subject to the 
rule of reason and suggested that they will fail to withstand that scrutiny 
where the sums paid in settlement exceed the probable litigation costs 
thus avoided.295 To reach this decision, the Court had to look past the 
fact that any anticompetitive effect attendant upon the pay-for-delay 
agreement fell within the scope of a presumptively valid patent.296 
Traditionally, antitrust was understood to patrol the borders of a patent’s 
scope, but it had no bearing on anticompetitive effects lying within the 
patent’s claims. The Supreme Court once said that a patent was “an 
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to 
access to a free and open market.”297  
In contrast, Actavis holds that “patent and antitrust policies are both 
relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and 
consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”298 
From now on, an inquiry into whether a restraint “‘fall[s] within’ the 
legitimate ‘scope’ of the patent’s ‘exclusionary potential’” does not 
control the outcome. 299 Rather, one answers “the antitrust question by 
considering traditional antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive 
effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting 
legal considerations present in the circumstances, such as . . . those 
related to patents.”300 
                                                                                                                     
 293. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 294. Id. at 2227, 2229.  
 295. See id. at 2236–37. 
 296. See id. at 2234.  
 297. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) (quoting 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)). 
 298. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
 299. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1309, 1312 
(11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223). 
 300. Id. 
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Actavis clarified that conduct tending to secure patents against 
invalidation carries anticompetitive effects. Since patents carry 
probabilistic rights to exclude only, it is not their “exclusionary 
potential” that matters but their “actual preclusive scope.”301 The Court 
emphasized that “the patent-related policy of eliminating unwarranted 
patent grants so the public will not ‘continually be required to pay 
tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.’”302 
Consequently, a restraint is anticompetitive if it bolsters an invalid 
patent because “‘the public interest in granting patent monopolies’ 
exists only to the extent that ‘the public is given a novel and useful 
invention’ in ‘consideration for its grant.’”303 
These observations shed much light on PAE aggregation. As 
explained above, that practice is most problematic from an antitrust 
policy standpoint when it facilitates hold-up by using patents that are 
likely invalid or not infringed. Certain PAEs engage in mass-scale 
aggregation that transforms IPRs that are individually of nugatory value 
into a collective whole that is impervious to invalidation and allows the 
patent aggregator to extract tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars 
in licensing fees. Not even the richest technology company can afford to 
litigate thousands of patents in a portfolio to demonstrate that all or 
almost all were improvidently granted. Forcing licensees to pay large 
royalties for invalid patents runs contrary to both the patent and antitrust 
policies emphasized in Actavis. In short, PAEs can no longer maintain 
that the anticompetitive effects of their accumulation are invulnerable to 
antitrust scrutiny because they fall within the “scope” of the patents. 
Finally, in exploring whether PAE aggregation yields problematic 
monopoly power, one must distinguish innocuous from malign forms of 
patent accumulation. Even a monopolist may properly build imposing 
portfolios via internal research and development and by prosecuting its 
own inventions. The calculus is different, however, when reaching out 
to acquire others’ IPRs to exclude existing products.304 Potential 
anticompetitive effects are pronounced when a dominant firm targets its 
competitors’ existing goods and purchases IPRs that arguably read on 
them.305  
In none of these situations is patent aggregation inherently 
anticompetitive—its effects depend on the competitive dynamics of the 
                                                                                                                     
 301. Id. at 2230–31 (quoting Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1312). 
 302. Id. at 2233 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)). 
 303. Id. at 2232 (quoting United States v. Singer Mfg. Co, 374 U.S. 174, 199 (1963) 
(White, J., concurring)). 
 304. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Surely, a § 2 
violation will have occurred where . . . the dominant competitor in a market acquires a patent 
covering a substantial share of the same market that he knows when added to his existing share 
will afford him monopoly power.”). 
 305. Id.  
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industry in which the IPR acquisitions take place. Modern technology 
markets invite many situations in which patent accumulation facilitates 
commercialization of technology. The so-called Rockstar Consortium of 
Apple, Microsoft, BlackBerry, Ericsson, and Sony outbid Google for 
bankrupt Nortel’s portfolio of some 6000 “4G” telecommunications 
patents in June 2011 for $4.5 billion.306 Less than a year later, Google 
responded by paying $12.5 billion to acquire Motorola Mobility, 
specifically Motorola’s 17,000-patent portfolio claiming wireless 
technology.307 The implications of these massive acquisitions remain to 
be seen, but they may result in a mutual clearing position. By contrast, 
when the context surrounding patent aggregation is not one of relative 
stability between downstream competitors but one of unilateral 
dominance, the competitive dynamics shift. 
These observations do not control the antitrust implications of 
targeted PAE patent aggregation, but they are illuminative nevertheless. 
Defensive patent acquisitions designed to achieve equilibrium between 
similarly situated rivals are unlikely to be anticompetitive because their 
aim and effect are to clear positions to market technologies downstream. 
Conversely, dominant-firm acquisitions conducted for offensive reasons 
and likely to produce asymmetric hold-up positions are categorically 
different. 
4.  Noerr–Pennington Doctrine 
The Noerr–Pennington doctrine impedes much antitrust scrutiny of 
patentee conduct, and it poses a potential obstacle to a litigant who 
wishes to demonstrate that an IP holder commits actionable 
exclusionary conduct in filing lawsuits.308 In its most recent decision on 
the matter, Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Industries, Inc.,309 the Supreme Court explained that “[t]hose 
who petition government for redress are generally immune from 
antitrust liability,” except when the petition “is a mere sham to 
cover . . . an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships 
of a competitor.”310 As a result, the Court explained, a litigant loses 
immunity only if its lawsuit was “objectively baseless in the sense that 
                                                                                                                     
 306. Chris V. Nicholson, Apple and Microsoft Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 1, 2011, 4:58 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/apple-and-microsoft-beat-
google-for-nortel-patents/. 
 307. David Goldman, Google Seals $13 Billion Motorola Buy, CNN (May 22, 2012, 10:20 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/22/technology/google-motorola/.  
 308. For an illuminative discussion of how Noerr–Pennington may impede antitrust 
scrutiny of patentee misconduct, see Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250, 301–05 (2013). 
 309. 508 U.S. 49 (1992).  
 310. Id. at 56 (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127, 144 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits” 
and if “the baseless lawsuit conceals ‘an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor’ through the ‘use [of] the 
governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as 
an anticompetitive weapon.’”311 
As a preliminary observation, no immunity would attach where a 
PAE asserts patents that are weak to the point of being objectively 
baseless. In the hypothetical explored in the preceding Part, a PAE 
combining and asserting Tier C patents would thus fall outside the 
scope of the immunity recognized in Professional Real Estate Investors. 
To make things more interesting, however, assume that the patents at 
issue are of suspect validity but would nevertheless allow their owner to 
surpass the Professional Real Estate Investors standard. 
This doctrine should not immunize the form of PAE conduct 
analyzed in this Article for several reasons. First, the anticompetitive 
behavior at issue lies primarily in aggregating patents that are related in 
arguably reading on distinct features of a profitable, existing product. 
Private market transactions of that nature “have traditionally been 
objects of antitrust scrutiny” and do not involve petitioning the 
government or courts in any way.312 Thus, Noerr–Pennington immunity 
does not attach to the asset acquisitions through which PAEs build their 
portfolios and achieve otherwise absent monopoly power.313 The means 
through which PAEs realize the power so achieved is by threat and fact 
of filing a lawsuit. If that alone immunized PAE conduct, however, it 
would mean that many Supreme Court and Circuit decisions 
recognizing antitrust violations by patentees are wrong. When 
competitors pool their patents to exclude their common rivals through 
lawsuits, for example, they commit an actionable violation of Section 1 
even if the patents asserted are valid and infringed.314 As in the case of 
PAEs, the only way to give effect to the anticompetitive conduct is by 
                                                                                                                     
 311. Id. at 60–61 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, and City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor 
Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991)) (citation omitted). 
 312. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500–01 (1988). 
 313. This observation has two consequences. First, Noerr–Pennington would not impede a 
§ 7 challenge alleging that PAE’s acquisitions of patents. See, e.g., Gold Cross Ambulance v. 
City of Kan. City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 969 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff’d, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983). 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits transactions, “the effect [of which] . . . may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
Patents are “assets” for the purpose of § 7. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 
189 F. Supp. 153, 181–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (recognizing IPRs as asset acquisitions under § 7). 
The theory addressed in this Part would apply equally to a § 7 action, which would be more 
straightforward because Noerr–Pennington immunity would not be an issue. Second, an 
antitrust violation is complete before filing suit, even if filing an infringement suit were 
protected. 
 314. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013) (citing United 
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963)). 
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filing suit. Some courts have held that a member of an SSO that either 
fails to disclose or discloses but fraudulently agrees to license on 
FRAND terms, and later asserts its SEP, can violate Section 2.315 Again, 
the only means of holding up implementers of the standard and thus 
willfully acquiring the prohibited monopoly power is by filing or 
threatening to file suit. In short, a patentee cannot immunize 
independently unlawful behavior simply by filing a nonobjective 
baseless lawsuit.316  
Noerr–Pennington ought not to apply to PAE hold-up founded on 
serial patent assertion for another reason. The Professional Real Estate 
Investors standard discussed above applies to a single act of filing suit. 
The Supreme Court’s earlier California Motor Transportation Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited decision holds, however, that a litigant can also lose 
its immunity in filing “a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims . . . [to] 
produce[] an illegal result.”317 Every U.S. Circuit that has addressed the 
question demonstrates that Professional Real Estate Investors did not 
sub silentio overrule Trucking Unlimited.318 Consequently, a PAE that 
files suit several times using weak patents should not enjoy immunity, 
even if it happens to prevail on a small percentage of its claims.319 In 
that situation, the PAE is not seeking reasonable royalties as to the 
patents-in-suit; rather, it is using the legal process itself as a weapon to 
                                                                                                                     
 315. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 315 (3d Cir. 2007); see also 
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *4–8 (N.D. Cal. 
May 14, 2012). 
 316. See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513–14 (1972) 
(“It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they 
are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute.”); Premier Elec. Constr. 
Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358, 376 (7th Cir. 1987) (“There is no such thing 
as the lawful enforcement of a private cartel. . . . The first amendment does not protect efforts to 
enforce private cartels, in court or out.”); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff 
Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1264 (9th Cir. 1982) (“If Clipper can prove that the defendants 
engaged in activities which violated the antitrust laws, those violations do not become immune 
simply because the defendants used legal means . . . to enforce the violations. We find 
significant support for our holding in Supreme Court and circuit court decisions.”); see also In 
re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 526 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Noerr-Pennington provides 
immunity only for the narrow petitioning activity . . . and . . . this immunity does not provide 
overall immunity to other violations.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 317. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 513. 
 318. See Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 27, 
728 F.3d 354, 363–64 (4th Cir. 2013); USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council, 31 F.3d 800, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Primetime 24 Joint 
Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 100–01 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 319. See Waugh Chapel, 728 F.3d at 364–65; Primetime, 219 F.3d at 101; USS-POSCO, 31 
F.3d at 811. 
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coerce the prospective licensee into paying greater than ex ante royalties 
on the much larger portfolio of patents not in litigation.320 
CONCLUSION 
Most commentators agree that mass patent aggregation and assertion 
by PAEs are problematic.321 Public policy action now seems inevitable. 
Congress may pass legislation that would significantly impede low-scale 
PAE activity, and the Supreme Court in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank322 has 
already narrowed the circumstances in which inventors can legitimately 
patent computer-implemented technologies.323 Nevertheless, the largest 
PAEs will likely continue to hold up leading innovators by amassing 
hundreds or thousands of patents ostensibly reading on different 
elements of a firm’s successful products and services. Accordingly, the 
question is whether any other tools beyond patent reform are available 
to victims of PAE hold-up. This Article argues that an antitrust 
objection is at least theoretically sound. 
To be sure, crafting a viable antitrust theory in this space poses 
challenges. The IPRs underlying PAEs’ patent portfolios are rarely 
comprised of substitute technologies that would otherwise compete with 
one another in the absence of aggregation. Rather, the lion’s share of 
such IPRs are economic complements, which would usually suggest 
that combining such rights should enhance rather than diminish 
efficiency. The Noerr–Pennington doctrine generally permits a patentee 
to file nonfrivolous lawsuits. Furthermore, much patent aggregation is 
procompetitive. A great deal of IPR accumulation takes place within the 
economy on the part of manufacturing entities, defensive patent 
aggregators, or others. A workable antitrust theory against PAEs must 
lend itself to a suitable limiting principle. 
These concerns are surmountable. This Article seeks to debunk those 
objections by presenting a comprehensive theory of anticompetitive 
effect. In doing so, it has both explained the unique economic factors 
                                                                                                                     
 320. Some of the largest PAEs file multiple lawsuits against their targets, thus potentially 
triggering the Trucking Unlimited line of cases. Intellectual Ventures, for example, has filed 
multiple infringement actions against Symantec, Capital One, Canon, and others. E.g., 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00740, 2014 WL 1513273, 
at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2014); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Canon Inc., No. 11-792-SLR, 
2014 WL 1392568, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 10, 2014); Adrienne Kendrick, Intellectual Ventures 
Brings Second Patent Infringement Lawsuit Against Symantec, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 27, 2013, 
7:45 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/03/27/intellectual-ventures-patent-infringement-
lawsuit-symantec/id=37947/. 
 321. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 222. But see Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30; Adam Mossoff, 
The Myth of the “Patent Troll” Litigation Explosion, TRUTH ON MARKET (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2013/08/12/the-myth-of-the-patent-troll-litigation-explosion/. 
 322. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).  
 323. Id. at 2352.  
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that cause the accumulation of complements to undermine efficiency 
and outlined the legal principles on which an innovator might base a 
monopolization claim. In the right circumstances, PAE hold-up based 
on amassing weak patents should be actionable. 
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